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Rethinking Adequacy of Representation
Jay Tidmarsh*
Class representatives and class counsel must adequately represent the
members of a class. This principle forms the foundation for the modem
American class action, and it determines the structure of Rule 23 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and every analogous state class-action rule.,
The absence of adequate representation dooms the certification of a class.
The gnawing fear that class representation is inadequate-manifested
through such phrases as "collusion,",2 "conflicts of interest,"'3 "selling out the
class,",4 and "sweetheart deals" 5 -is an enduring criticism of class actions.
Indeed, the demand of adequate representation is so irresistible that in recent
years the principle has spread beyond class actions to other forms of aggre-
gate litigation.
6
Despite the allure of the principle, we have very little sense of what
adequate representation means, how we can measure it, or how we can
* Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School. I thank Roger Trangsrud and participants in
faculty forums at Loyola University Chicago School of Law, DePaul University College of Law,
George Washington University Law School, and the University of Cincinnati College of Law for
discussions and comments on early versions of this Article, and Adam Kern for research assistance.
1. FED. R. Civ. P. 23. Unless otherwise stated, all references to Rules are to the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure.
2. See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 45 (1940) (rejecting the representation as inadequate in
part because it afforded "opportunities ... for the fraudulent and collusive sacrifice of the rights of
absent parties"); Susan P. Koniak, Feasting While the Widow Weeps: Georgine v. Amchem
Products, Inc., 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1045, 1048 (1995) (describing "collusion between class
counsel and the defendants" in a mass-tort class-action settlement).
3. See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 625 (1997) (stating that the inquiry into
adequacy of representation "serves to uncover conflicts of interest between named parties and the
class they seek to represent").
4. See Culver v. City of Milwaukee, 277 F.3d 908, 910 (7th Cir. 2002) (recognizing "the danger
that the lawyer will sell out the class in exchange for the defendant's tacit agreement not to
challenge the lawyer's fee request").
5. See Bruce Hay & David Rosenberg, "Sweetheart" and "Blaclnail" Settlements in Class
Actions: Reality and Remedy, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1377, 1377 (2000) (noting that one of the
"dangers associated with the settlement of class actions" is "the problem of 'sweetheart'
settlements, in which the class members' interests are compromised by class counsel"); Charles
Silver, Class Actions-Representative Proceedings, in 5 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS
194, 213 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000) (discussing four types of "sweetheart
deals").
6. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 1.05 (Tentative Draft No. 1,
2008) [hereinafter AGGREGATE LITIGATION] (suggesting guidelines for dealing with all forms of
aggregate litigation to ensure adequate representation); Howard M. Erichson, Informal Aggregation:
Procedural and Ethical Implications of Coordination Among Counsel in Related Lawsuits, 50
DuKE L.J. 381, 468 (2000) (arguing that attorneys should, in the absence of formal class
certification, use written cooperation agreements to replicate the same protections available to class-
action plaintiffs).
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guarantee it. 7 We use a few heuristics-for instance, "conflicts of interest
and collusion are bad"--but the complexities of class-action practice quickly
blur even these seemingly bright-line measuring rods.8 If you look for them,
conflicts and the possibility of collusion lurk in almost every class action. 9
The question therefore becomes how great must the conflict of interest be or
how strong must the evidence of collusion be in order to deem a class's rep-
resentation inadequate. '
0
Some of the difficulty in determining the meaning and measure of
adequate representation derives from the ambiguities in Hansberry v. Lee,"I
the seminal case that rooted adequate representation, at least in part, in the
Constitution.12 A greater part of the difficulty is the ambivalent relationship
between the requirement of adequate representation and the underlying goal
of class actions. The class action sweeps together parties with similarly situ-
ated claims, 3 thus avoiding one or more of a number of evils-to the
litigants, to the absent class members, or to the court system-that repetitive
individual litigation creates.14  But these economic and social benefits can
often be reaped even when the representation of the class members is less
than adequate. To take a crass example, a class action might achieve more
deterrent effect at no greater litigation expense if the class representative and
class counsel were allowed to split ninety-nine percent of the recovery due to
class members;' 5 but such an arrangement would surely doom class
7. See Richard A. Nagareda, Administering Adequacy in Class Representation, 82 TEXAS L.
REv. 287, 288 (2003) ("For all the agreement on the centrality of adequate representation to the
modem class action.., there remains remarkably little agreement on the content of that concept or
how to enforce it.").
8. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Beneficial Nat'l Bank, 288 F.3d 277, 282 (7th Cir. 2002) ("[I]n light of
the modesty of the stakes ... we are not disposed to regard this [conflict of interest] as fatal."); In re
"Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 800 F.2d 14, 19 (2d Cir. 1986) (noting that principles of
efficiency and fairness uniquely implicated in class actions may compel a court to disregard
technical conflicts of interest in order to allow an attorney to continue representation of the class);
JACK B. WEINSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE IN MASS TORT LITIGATION 46 (1995) ("The common
practice in mass tort cases ... unfortunately has been to ignore ethical problems in the name of
expediency.").
9. For a discussion of the inevitability of conflicts of interest, see infra Part tI.
10. See Charles Silver & Lynn Baker, I Cut, You Choose: The Role of Plaintiffs' Counsel In
Allocating Settlement Proceeds, 84 VA. L. REv. 1465, 1468-69 (1998) ("There being no way to
eliminate conflicts [of interest] from multiple-claimant representations, the only question is how to
deal with them.").
11. 311U.S. 32 (1940).
12. For a discussion of Hansberry and its ambiguities, see infra notes 66-91 and accompanying
text.
13. Class actions can be brought on behalf of a class of claimants or against a class of persons.
The former are usually, though misleadingly, referred to as "plaintiff class actions," and the latter as
"defendant class actions." See Taylor v. Sturgell, 128 S. Ct. 2161, 2172 (2008) (noting that
members of a class are in fact "nonparties" bound by the judgment). In this Article, I will refer only
to the far more common plaintiff class action, although my analysis applies equally to both types.
14. For an expanded description of these evils, see infra subpart l(B).
15. This arrangement could be economically justified on the ground that, from the viewpoint of
deterrence, the recipient of the recovery is irrelevant and the award of the bulk of recovery to the
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certification because of self-dealing by the representative and counsel. Thus,
adequacy of representation can retard the realization of the benefits of class
treatment. The desire to realize those benefits can lead a court to compro-
mise on the bright-line version of adequacy that absolutely bars class
treatment when conflicts of interest surface.
This Article argues that the doctrine of adequacy of representation
should be recast to achieve a single, easily determined metric: Representation
by class representatives and counsel is adequate if, and only if, the represen-
tation makes class members no worse off than they would have been if they
had engaged in individual litigation.1 6 In explaining this metric, Part I begins
by locating class actions and adequacy of representation within the tradition
of American adversarialism, which privileges individual autonomy and self-
interested behavior in joinder decisions. Class actions constitute an excep-
tion to the principle of individual autonomy, and adequate representation-
traditionally understood to require the avoidance of conflicts of interest or
collusion-acts as the antidote to the self-interest of the class representative
and class counsel. But this combination of class litigation and adequate rep-
resentation is inherently unstable. As Part II describes, the reasons that class
actions are thought to be necessary invariably generate the very conflicts of
interest, either among class members or between class members and class
counsel, that the traditional view of adequate representation forbids. Part III
then explains how the metric I have described-the requirement that class
representation not worsen the expected litigation outcomes of class
members-avoids the friction between the utility of class treatment and the
demands of adequate representation. Part III also responds to the objections
to the use of this metric.
Throughout this Article, I draw on moral philosophy and economics to
describe the present conundrum of adequate representation and to justify the
new metric for measuring adequacy. From within moral and economic
theory, the metric seems unremarkable. It is closely associated with well-
known principles such as the Rawlsian veil of ignorance and Pareto
improvements. Why we have not adopted this simple metric, and why we
must, is the story of this Article.
I. The Rise of Adequate Representation
This Part lays out the basic argument for the doctrine of adequate
representation. I begin by considering traditional principles of joinder, to
class representative and class counsel creates an incentive to maximize recovery. For the classic
argument advancing the private-attorney-general rationale, see generally Harry Kalven, Jr. &
Maurice Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the Class Suit, 8 U. CHI. L. REV. 684, 716-17
(1941). For a critique of its operation in practice, see generally John C. Coffee, Jr., Rescuing the
Private Attorney General: Why the Model of the Lawyer as Bounty Hunter is Not Working, 42 MD.
L. REV. 215 (1983).
16. This sentence is too simplistic. Later, I add a necessary refinement concerning a type of
class-action litigation known as "negative-value suits." See infra text accompanying note 170.
2009] 1139
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which class actions constitute a critical exception. I describe why class
actions are thought to be a necessary exception and why adequate
representation is thought to be a necessary corollary to this exception.
A. Traditional Joinder. The Principle of Self-Interested Autonomy
In the American system, plaintiffs typically make the critical decisions
affecting the structure of their cases: who to sue, when to sue, in which court
to sue, which claims to assert, which lawyer to employ, and whether to join
forces with other potential plaintiffs.1 7 This "master of the complaint" con-
cept is deeply ingrained in the law.' 8  A related, and equally embedded,
principle is one of preclusion: "[O]ne is not bound by a judgment in
personam in a litigation in which he is not designated as a party or to which
he has not been made a party by service of process."' 9 In combination, the
17. Exceptions exist. Through a counterclaim, a defendant can add new claims against the
plaintiff. See FED. R. Civ. P. 13(a) (compulsory counterclaims); FED. R. Civ. P. 13(b) (permissive
counterclaims). Through a crossclaim, a defendant can insert a claim against a co-party, see FED. R.
Civ. P. 13(g), and through a third-party claim a defendant can add a new party who "is or may be
liable" to the defendant, see FED. R. Civ. P. 14(a). In addition, in limited circumstances, procedural
codes sometimes mandate, when feasible, the joinder of persons that the plaintiff has not joined and
typically afford nonjoined parties the opportunity to intervene in the case. See FED. R. Civ. P. 19(a)
(necessary joinder); FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a) (intervention of right); FED. R. Civ. P. 24(b) (permissive
intervention). Class actions, of course, constitute another exception. In reality, plaintiffs' counsel
exercises many of these powers. See Deborah R. Hensler, Resolving Mass Toxic Torts: Myths and
Realities, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 89, 92-97 (documenting the marginal degree of control that tort
plaintiffs exercise over their claims).
18. Strictly speaking, the "master of the complaint" idea refers to the plaintiffs ability to
choose the forum by means of including or excluding certain parties and claims in the complaint.
See, e.g., Lincoln Prop. Co. v. Roche, 546 U.S. 81, 94 (2005) (affirming a plaintiffs right to
maintain federal court diversity jurisdiction by declining to permissively join additional potential
defendants); Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vomado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 831-32
(2002) (rejecting the view that the presence of a federal question in a defendant's counterclaim is
sufficient to establish "arising under" jurisdiction because that view would undermine the principle
that the plaintiff is the "master of the complaint" by "defeating [the] plaintiffs choice of forum");
Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 395 (1987) (upholding a plaintiffs right to select which
legal claims to bring as a way to control the judicial forum in which those claims are heard); The
Fair v. Kohler Die & Specialty Co., 228 U.S. 22, 25 (1913) ("Of course the party who brings a suit
is master to decide what law he will rely upon...."); see also 16 JAMES WM. MOORE, MOORE'S
FEDERAL PRACTICE § 107.14[2][c][v] (3d ed. 2005) ("In general, the plaintiff is the master of the
complaint.., and has the option of naming only those parties the plaintiff chooses to sue, subject
only to the rules ofjoinder of necessary parties."). But the concept also implies the right to choose
counsel. See Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424, 441 (1985) (Brennan, J.,
concurring) ("A fundamental premise of the adversary system is that individuals have the right to
retain the attorney of their choice to represent their interests in judicial proceedings."); id. at 442
(Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Everyone must agree that the litigant's freedom to choose his own lawyer
in a civil case is a fundamental right.").
19. Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40 (1940); accord Richards v. Jefferson County, 517 U.S.
793, 798-99 (1996); Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 761-64 (1989); Chase Nat'l Bank v. Norwalk,
291 U.S. 431, 441 (1934). Hansberry elevated this principle to constitutional stature, rooting it in
notions of both due process and full faith and credit. See Hansberry, 311 U.S. at 40-41. Cases
have recognized exceptions to the principle in the conclaves of class actions, Hansberry, 311 U.S. at
41; "special remedial schemes" such as bankruptcy, Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. at 762 n.2; suits
brought by those in privity with a prior party, Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153 (1979);
1140 [Vol. 87:1137
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two principles mean that no judgment can bind a plaintiff unless she consents
to join the case as a party.
Effectively, therefore, the default principle is the permissive, or
voluntary, joinder of plaintiffs: Each plaintiff must agree to join the case. At
the federal level, Rule 20(a) embodies this principle, and permits the joinder
of plaintiffs when their claims for relief "aris[e] out of the same transaction,
occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences" '20 and "any question of
law or fact common to all plaintiffs will arise in the action." 2' Although am-
biguously expressed in the word "may," 22 the idea underlying Rule 20(a) is
to give each plaintiff the choice to join a case.23
Voluntary joinder is highly consonant with the adversarial approach to
litigation employed in American courts. The adversarial system places con-
trol over critical litigation decisions regarding the shaping of proofs and
arguments in the hands of each party. 24 Because few decisions so affect the
proofs and arguments as the joinder of those with whom and against whom
the case will proceed,25 placing the joinder decision in the hands of each
and in three other limited areas, see Taylor v. Sturgell, 128 S. Ct. 2161, 2172-73 (2008). Taylor
identified these three circumstances as a nonparty's agreement to be bound by a judgment, a
nonparty's assumption of control over prior litigation, and litigation brought by a nonparty proxy on
behalfofa party to prior litigation. Id.
20. FED. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(l)(A).
21. FED. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(l)(B). Because it is difficult to imagine any claims involving the
same transaction or occurrence that would not also involve a common question of law or fact, the
independent significance of Rule 20(a)(l)(B) is uncertain. See JAY TIDMARSH & ROGER H.
TRANGSRUD, COMPLEX LITIGATION AND THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM 108 (1998) (questioning
whether "the common 'question of law or fact' requirement in Rule 20 [is] superfluous").
22. See FED. R. CIV. P. 20(a)(l) ("Persons may join in one action as plaintiffs .... ").
23. Indeed, the idea of individual consent is so embedded in Rule 20(a) that, despite the
arguable ambiguity in the rule, it is difficult to find cases that discuss whether a plaintiff can use
Rule 20(a) to join another plaintiff involuntarily. In Cle-Ware Rayco, Inc. v. Perlstein, 401 F. Supp.
1231 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), the court granted a motion to make a third-party defendant an additional
plaintiff, but it was not clear from the opinion whether the third-party defendant consented to
joinder as a plaintiff or was joined involuntarily. See id. at 1232-33 (joining a corporation as a
party plaintiff after a merger between that corporation and the named plaintiff). In Lyne v. Arthur
Anderson & Co., No. 91 C 1885, 1991 WL 247576 (N.D. Il1. Nov. 12, 1991), a court refused to
allow ten plaintiffs who had joined together under Rule 20(a) to use the rule to join another seven
plaintiffs involuntarily, noting that "[t]here is nothing fundamentally fair about joining plaintiffs
who have expressed no interest in participating in this litigation." Id. at *3.
24. See Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 383-84
(1978) ("[Tlhe true significance of partisan advocacy lies deeper, touching... the integrity of the
adjudicative process itself.... Each advocate comes to the hearing prepared to present his proofs
and arguments .... ).
25. Cf Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767, 782-87 (9th Cir. 1996) (permitting proof of
damages through statistical sampling and a master's testimony, rather than individualized proof of
damages, in a class action containing 10,000 members). Experimental data suggest that the
aggregation of claims increases the likelihood of recovery on weak claims, but suppresses the value
of strong claims. Irwin A. Horowitz & Kenneth S. Bordens, The Effects of Outlier Presence,
Plaintiff Population Size, and Aggregation of Plaintiffs on Simulated Civil Jury Decisions, 12 LAW
& HUM. BEHAV. 209, 226 (1988) [hereinafter Horowitz & Bordens, Aggregation]; see Irwin A.
Horowitz & Kenneth S. Bordens, The Consolidation of Plaintiffs: The Effects of Number of
Plaintiffs on Jurors' Liability Decisions, Damage Awards, and Cognitive Processing of Evidence,
2009] 1141
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plaintiff makes perfect sense from the viewpoint of adversarial theory. At a
deeper level, both the adversarial system in general and voluntary joinder in
particular respond to the same philosophical intuition about individual
autonomy: Allowing individuals the freedom to act on and to govern their
own legal affairs is a political and moral good.26
The American version of adversarialism embodies another principle: In
making basic decisions regarding the structure and prosecution of a case, a
plaintiff is entitled to be guided by self-interest. The relationship between
autonomy and self-interest is evident, but hardly inevitable; for instance, a
Kantian conception of autonomy leads to the recognition of duties that can-
not be justified by, and often are inconsistent with, an individual's self-
interest.27 Whatever the philosophical justification, the American litigation
system does not expect litigants to be concerned with the effects of their liti-
gation decisions on the positions or rights of others. The freedom to act
given to the plaintiff in the adversarial system includes the freedom to act in
a decidedly self-interested fashion. Thus, a plaintiff is within her rights to
join with others when it advances her interests, and equally within her rights
to refuse to join with others when doing so does not advance her interests-
even when other plaintiffs' claims, the defendant's position, or society's in-
28terests are made worse by her decision.
85 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 909, 914 (2000) [hereinafter Horowitz & Bordens, Consolidation]
(reporting data showing that the likelihood of recovery increases with the inclusion of more
plaintiffs, but the average damage award decreases if more than four plaintiffs are aggregated).
26. See STEPHAN LANDSMAN, READINGS ON ADVERSARIAL JUSTICE: THE AMERICAN
APPROACH TO ADJUDICATION 33-39 (1988) (defending the adversarial process as important to
maintaining a free society); Monroe H. Freedman, How Lawyers Act in the Interests of Justice, 70
FORDHAM L. REV. 1717, 1727 (2002) ("[W]orking within the rule of law in our constitutionalized
adversary system, we enhance our clients' autonomy as free citizens in a free society."); Fuller,
supra note 24, at 372 (discussing the relationship between adjudication and the rule of law).
27. See Immanuel Kant, On the Common Saying: "This May Be True in Theory, But It Does
Not Apply in Practice," reprinted in KANT: POLITICAL WRITINGS 61, 70 (Hans Reiss ed., H.B.
Nisbet trans., 2d ed. 1991) ("[T]he concept of duty.., is far more powerful, incisive and likely to
promote success than all incentives borrowed from the ... selfish principle [of happiness]."); David
Luban, Lawyers as Upholders of Human Dignity (When They Aren't Busy Assaulting It), 2005 U.
ILL. L. REV. 815, 826 ("Kantian autonomy represents freedom achieved through stoic self-control
and self-command; it means reasoned self-restraint. Freedom of choice represents casting off
restraints.").
28. Due to the costliness of litigation, a plaintiffs lawsuit almost invariably worsens the
defendant's position. I do not suggest that it is unjust for the plaintiff to invoke the machinery of
the legal system when she has a nonfrivolous claim. What I mean when I describe a plaintiffs
"worsening" of the positions of other plaintiffs, defendants, or society is the plaintiffs imposition of
costs above and beyond the direct and ordinary costs of litigating and satisfying a judgment or
settlement. To take a paradigmatic situation of worsening a defendant's position, consider an
interpleader-type scenario in which a defendant holds 1,000 shares of stock that multiple plaintiffs
claim. If one plaintiff successfully brings an action and recovers the stock, the defendant might be
subject to later suits by other plaintiffs, who, as nonparties to the first case, are not bound by the
finding in the first case that the stock belongs to the first plaintiff. See supra note 19 and
accompanying text. The defendant might thus be subject to numerous judgments when only one is
appropriate. To take a paradigmatic situation of worsening other potential plaintiffs' positions, if
we assume that the sum total of claims exceeds a defendant's assets, an early plaintiff that receives
1142 [Vol. 87:1137
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Viewed from the vantage point of moral philosophy, this license to act
in a purely self-interested way, and to ignore the harms that actions cause
others, is intriguing. Somewhat simplistically, ethical theories can be divided
into the nonconsequentialist (i.e., evaluating the moral significance of actions
without regard to their consequences) and the consequentialist (i.e., evaluat-
ing the moral significance of actions by evaluating their consequences).29
Nonconsequentialist ethical theories subdivide into two branches: virtue
ethics, which emphasizes the development of moral character in the actor,3°
and deontological ethics, which emphasizes the moral quality of the action
and often leads to the specification of duties, rules, and obligations. 31 Conse-
quentialist theories subdivide into three branches. The first is egoism, which
involves either a claim that people inevitably act only in their own self-
interest (psychological egoism), or a claim that they should act only in their
own self-interest (ethical egoism).32  The opposite theory is altruism, which
full satisfaction can cause later plaintiffs to receive less than a proportional share of the defendant's
assets. The paradigmatic example of increasing social costs results from a refusal to join with
similarly situated plaintiffs, thus generating unnecessary expenses associated with the repetitive
relitigation of common issues.
Another potential cost in entrusting joinder decisions to the plaintiff is a shift, in the plaintiffs
favor, of the probability of recovery when multiple cases are joined. See supra note 25. If we
assume that a decision rendered in individual litigation is the most accurate (an admittedly
controversial assumption), a shift in the outcome due to joinder makes a judgment less accurate.
Loss in accuracy is a cost to the defendant, as well as a social cost. See RICHARD A. POSNER,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 21.1-21.2, at 593-95 (7th ed. 2007) (arguing that, from the
perspective of an individual defendant or society, when the cost of judicial error outweighs the per-
case cost of reducing the chance of such error, the result of judicial error is a net social loss, which
should not be tolerated). The extent of this cost is uncertain, for the loss in accuracy due to the
aggregation of claims might be offset by lower per-plaintiff awards in aggregated proceedings. See
Horowitz & Bordens, Consolidation, supra note 25, at 914.
29. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Consequentialism, in THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2008) [hereinafter ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY], http:/
plato.stanford.edu/archives/fa112008/entries/consequentialism ("Consequentialism, as its name
suggests, is the view that normative properties depend only on consequences.").
30. Rosalind Hursthouse, Virtue Ethics, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, supra note 29,
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fa112003/entries/ethics-virtue. Virtue theories are sometimes
referred to as "aretaic theories" after the Greek word arete, or "virtue." See Lawrence B. Solum,
Public Legal Reasoning, 94 VA. L. REv. 1449, 1463 (2006) (referring to virtue theories as aretaic
theories and describing the Greek origin of the term).
31. Larry Alexander & Michael Moore, Deontological Ethics, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY, supra note 29, http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2007/entries/ethics-deonto
logical. Some deontological theories exclude consideration of the consequences of actions, but
others allow such consideration while denying that the only measure of good action is its
consequences. See Solum, supra note 30, at 1463 ("Some deontological theories exclude
consequentialist reasons altogether .... Other deontological moral theories allow for the
consideration of consequences but maintain that considerations of fairness trump good
consequences in other circumstances.").
32. Robert Shaver, Egoism, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, supra note 29, http://plato.
stanford.edu/archives/win2002/entries/egoism. A related theory is rational egoism, which argues
that it is rational for a person to act in her self-interest and irrational not to. Id. Egoist theories
allow for the possibility that cooperation among people is possible, but they assert that cooperation
occurs only when the mutual best interests of the parties dictate cooperation. Id.
2009] 1143
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argues that people should act to advance the interests of others, giving little
or no regard to their own interests. 33  The third consequentialist theory is
utilitarianism, which argues that people should act to maximize the utility of
all (both self and others).34 Neoclassical economic theory, which holds that
actors should maximize wealth, is a form of consequentialism aligned with
the utilitarian branch.35
If we seek a philosophical justification for the self-regarding nature of
American adversarialism, the nonconsequentialist theories are barren soil;
abject self-interest is not a virtue, and deontological theories reject the le-
gitimacy of acting according to consequences, whether it is self-enriching or
not. Nor, for obvious reasons, is it possible to justify self-interested litigation
behavior on the consequentialist theory of altruism. Therefore, the only phi-
losophical positions that justify plaintiffs' license to attend to only their own
self-interest in joinder decisions are egoist or utilitarian. The egoist argu-
ment-that parties should be able to conduct litigation with only their own
interests in mind-clearly supports the principle of voluntary joinder. But
egoism has greater difficulty accounting for the transactional constraint on
Rule 20(a) joinder, which can be more readily justified on a fairness or a
utilitarian basis.36  Utilitarian acceptance of self-interested behavior,
however, is conditional: A plaintiff's self-interested joinder decisions can be
justified only if the benefits of such decisions-in terms of deterrence of
33. John Doris & Stephen Stich, Moral Psychology: Empirical Approaches, in ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF PHILOSOPHY, supra note 29, http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2006/entries/moral-psych-
emp. I will not deal with the issue of whether a person must care more for others than for herself, or
whether a person is entitled to weigh her interests proportionally with those of others.
34. Sinnott-Armstrong, supra note 29. I use "welfare" as a neutral term. Utilitarian theories
disagree amongst themselves about exactly what should be maximized: individual happiness, social
well-being, wealth, or preference satisfaction. See Solum, supra note 30, at 1492 (exposing
contradictions between and within utilitarian theories of individual well-being and preference
satisfaction).
35. See Eyal Zamir & Barak Medina, Law, Morality, and Economics: Integrating Moral
Constraints with Economic Analysis of Law, 96 CAL. L. REV. 323, 329-30 (2008) (discussing
utilitarianism and welfare economics as examples of consequentialist theories). But see Richard A.
Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 103, 119-27 (1979)
(distinguishing between utilitarianism (or "welfare maximization") and "wealth maximization").
36. Cf Desert Empire Bank v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 623 F.2d 1371, 1375 (9th Cir. 1980)
(refusing to accept the plaintiff's decision to join defendants under Rule 20(a) unless "the
permissive joinder of a [defendant] will comport with the principles of fundamental fairness").
Although egoism might justify such restrictions-with the argument that some accommodation and
cooperation are necessary in order to avoid ruthlessness that would in the end hurt everyone's self-
interest-the transactional limitation in Rule 20(a) is better explained by, and usually described in
terms of, efficiency. See, e.g., Mosley v. Gen. Motors Corp., 497 F.2d 1330, 1332 (8th Cir. 1974)
("The purpose of [Rule 20(a)] is to promote trial convenience and expedite the final determination
of disputes, thereby preventing multiple lawsuits."). Other restrictions that American
adversarialism imposes on self-regarding behavior-such as restrictions on the ability of parties to
lie or to bring frivolous claims, or on the ability of lawyers to represent conflicting interests, see
FED. R. Civ. P. 11; MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7-1.9, 3.3-3.5 (1983)-likewise are
more readily explained on non-egoist (whether virtue-based, deontological, altruistic, or utilitarian)
grounds.
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wrongful behavior, efficient disposition of litigation, accuracy of judgments,
and acceptability of judgments among a people with a strong affinity for
freedom of action and hostility to government intervention that Americans
evince37 -outweigh the benefits of other joinder arrangements that give the
parties less freedom of action.38 Because an empirical demonstration that
plaintiff autonomy generates these net benefits has never been made,
however, the utilitarian case for entrusting to the plaintiff the power to make
self-interested joinder decisions is uncertain. At best, it appears that the
American approach to joinder is essentially egoist, with some case-by-case
nonconsequentialist (i.e., fairness-based) and utilitarian constraints on abject
self-interest.
Egoism and utilitarianism are controversial ethical theories, as is the
pursuit of wealth-maximizing efficiency. I do not suggest that, in adopting
an adversarial approach to litigation, and in granting plaintiffs wide discre-
tion in making joinder decisions, our Anglo-American ancestors consciously
intended to adopt and apply one or more of these theories. As Holmes once
observed, "The law did not begin with a theory. It has never worked one
out. ' 39  Our adversarial approach in general, and our joinder rules in
particular, are products more of historical circumstance than of deduction
from first principles of moral or economic theory.40 Nor am I suggesting that
the law of joinder has as its only operative principle the satisfaction of plain-
tiffs' desires. Nonetheless, whatever we might think of a license to act in a
selfish fashion, two significant facts stand out: first, American adversarialism
countenances a high degree of self-interested behavior in the plaintiffs'
choice to join---or not to join-with other plaintiffs; and second, that self-
interested behavior within this sphere can be justified on certain
philosophical and economic grounds.
B. Class-Action Joinder: An Incomplete Tempering of the Principle of Self-
Interested Autonomy
Class actions stand the individual plaintiffs joinder autonomy on its
head. The class action bundles together the claims of similarly situated
claimants, and nominates a class representative and class counsel to prose-
cute these claims on each claimant's behalf. Thus, the members of a class
37. See generally MIRJAN R. DAMA KA, THE FACES OF JUSTICE AND STATE AUTHORITY 47-
70 (1986) (arguing that the political commitments and structures of a nation determine the nation's
basic orientation in its procedural system).
38. Again, "benefits" is a soft word, for I have not suggested any measure-whether money,
happiness, or some other metric-for these benefits. The efficiency orientation of the transactional
limit on Rule 20(a) joinder suggests that our system typically uses an economic, or wealth-
maximizing, approach to measuring benefits. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
39. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 77 (1881).
40. Cf Norman W. Spaulding, The Rule of Law in Action: A Defense of Adversary System
Values, 93 CORNELL L. REv. 1377, 1399-1403 (2008) (describing the historical roots and evolving
tradition of the adversarial system).
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lose rights that the American adversarial system affords nonclass litigants.
Class members do not get the opportunity to decide with whom and against
whom to file suit; they do not control the forum, the timing of their cases, or
the presentation of the proofs and arguments concerning their claims. Mem-
bers of the class will probably never talk with their lawyer; their lawyer will
likely never know the details and circumstances of their individual claims.
Indeed, class members might never know that they are parties in the case.
Yet the judgment obtained on the class's behalf binds the members to the
outcome. The license to act self-interestedly by refusing to join another's
lawsuit collapses.4 '
Strong reasons must accompany such a fundamental reordering of the
litigation paradigm. At the federal level, Rule 23(b) provides four such
reasons.42 First, a class action can be certified when the plaintiffs' autonomy
to bring separate actions creates a risk of "inconsistent or varying
adjudications... that would establish incompatible standards of conduct for"
the defendant.43 Second, a class action can be certified when one plaintiffs
autonomous decision to bring a lawsuit might result in a judgment "that, as a
practical matter, would be dispositive of the interests of the other members"
of the class or "would substantially impair or impede their ability to protect
their interests." 4  Third, class treatment is proper when "final injunctive re-
lief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a
whole. ''45 Finally, a class action may be maintained when "the questions of
law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions af-
fecting only individual members" and "a class action is superior to other
available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy. '" 6
It is possible to restate and unify these four scenarios in a single
principle: An individual plaintiff's autonomy to choose not to join with other
plaintiffs stops when that choice threatens harm to others47-- whether that
harm is to other potential plaintiffs, who might find their own interests
41. As I describe infra at notes 54-56 and accompanying text, in some circumstances a class
member can retain a measure of autonomy by opting out of the class.
42. In addition, a class action must meet the six requirements of Rule 23(a). These
requirements can loosely be grouped into two meta-requirements: efficiency and adequate
representation. Gen. Tel. Co. of the Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157 n.13 (1982). For further
discussion, see infra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
43. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(A).
44. FED. R. Crv. P. 23(b)(1)(B).
45. FED. R. CIv. P. 23(b)(2).
46. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). In assessing these two requirements of predominance and
superiority, Rule 23(b)(3) lists four relevant factors to consider: "the class members' interests in
individually controlling the prosecution" of their claims; "the extent and nature" of any individual
actions that class members have already brought; "the desirability or undesirability of concentrating
the litigation of the claims in the particular forum"; and "the likely difficulties in managing a class
action." FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)(A)-(D).
47. Again, the concept of "harm" does not encompass the imposition of the ordinary costs of
good faith litigation on the defendant or the court system. See supra note 28 and accompanying
text.
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impaired by the plaintiffs choice to sue separately; to the defendant, who
might be whipsawed by inconsistent judgments of multiple plaintiffs exer-
cising their choices to sue separately or else beaten down by the costs of
repetitive litigation; or to society, which finds individual litigation too expen-
sive a luxury to subsidize or too vagarious a method to deter illegal conduct.
The harm must be more than de minimis: Rule 23 allows a class action only
when the class of plaintiffs "is so numerous that joinder of all members is
impracticable. ' '4  Once that threshold is crossed, however, Rule 23 sacrifices
individual class members' abilities to pursue self-interested litigation strate-
gies to the achievement of a greater good.
Cast in this light, the class action embodies a consequentialist
perspective to joinder: Avoidance of negative consequences, not the
inculcation of virtue in litigants or the fulfillment of a priori litigation duties
toward others, is its principal justification. Indeed, Rule 23 works out, in a
particular litigation context, the limits of autonomy. Captured in the famous
aphorism that my right to swing my fist ends where your nose begins,49 a
central problem in consequentialist ethical theory is to specify the point (if
any) at which a person's autonomy to act must yield to the harm that those
actions cause others. Rule 23's answer to that question appears to reject an
egoist stance and to embrace a rule-utilitarian approach to class treatment.50
In two important ways, however, Rule 23 retains an orientation toward
individual autonomy. First, class members retain some rights to promote or
protect their individual claims. In all class actions, class members may seek
to intervene to "present claims or defenses, or otherwise to come into the
action," 51 and in Rule (b)(3) class actions, class members are entitled to
48. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1).
49. The saying is usually used as a shorthand description of Mill's argument for liberty. See
JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (1859), reprinted in ON LIBERTY WITH THE SUBJECTION OF
WOMEN AND CHAPTERS ON SOCIALISM 13-16,56-57, 75-76,94-96 (Stefan Collini ed., Cambridge
Univ. Press 1989).
50. Utilitarian theory can be divided into "act utilitarianism" and "rule utilitarianism." Under
the former, the moral significance of an action is determined by whether that specific action
maximizes utility. A problem with act utilitarianism is the costliness of engaging in this inquiry for
every action. Rule utilitarianism seeks to eliminate those costs by establishing rules of behavior
that, in the main, maximize utility; even though the rule does not maximize for each action, the
savings from not needing to engage in an action-by-action evaluation exceed the losses in utility in
specific cases. Sinnott-Armstrong, supra note 29. Rule 23's four scenarios for class treatment
could thus be seen as the rule makers' conclusion about the occasions when, in the main, the costs
of permitting individual litigation exceed the costs of the lost autonomy that class certification
entails.
Some might argue that Rule 23 even reflects an altruistic (rather than a utilitarian) impulse,
allowing individuals to sacrifice their autonomy to bring their own claims and to take up the burden
of championing the claims of others. Although I do not deny the possibility that a class
representative and class counsel might take on class litigation for altruistic reasons, the ensuing
paragraphs describe the reasons that altruism constitutes a poor justification for Rule 23.
51. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(d)(l)(B)(iii), 24(a), 24(b); see THOMAS E. WILLGING ET AL., FED.
JUDICIAL CTR., EMPIRICAL STUDY OF CLASS ACTIONS IN FOUR FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS 56
(1996) (indicating that intervention occurred in 0% to 11% of cases in four class-action data sets).
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52appear through their own counsel. Moreover, filing a class action does not
prevent class members from also filing individual cases, or even prevent
"dueling" class actions; as long as they beat the class action in the race to
judgment or settlement, individual class members can enjoy the benefits of
their individual resolution.53
The most significant provision retaining individual autonomy, however,
is the opt-out right for (b)(3) class members. 54 In effect, the (b)(3) opt-out
right returns to the individual the decision of whether to join with others or to
strike out independently. By requiring an affirmative decision to opt out,
rather than by adopting a Rule 20(a)-like demand that each plaintiff affirma-
tively opt in,55 Rule 23(b)(3) flips the consequence for doing nothing from
nonjoinder to joinder. This flip in the default rule is hardly insignificant; the
apathetic plaintiff, the tardy plaintiff, and the plaintiff who never receives
notice of the right to opt out lose control of their lawsuits. Nonetheless, in
light of the prevalence of (b)(3) class actions over either (b)(1) or (b)(2) class
This opportunity to intervene is something less than the full "master of the complaint" autonomy
guaranteed individual litigants, because the appearing class member loses the right to determine
when, where, with whom, and against whom to file suit. In addition, most courts granted only
permissive intervention under Rule 24(b), id., and courts can impose significant limitations on the
opportunity of permissive intervenors to participate, see 7C CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL.,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1922 (3d ed. 2007).
52. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B)(iv).
53. See Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 179 F.3d 641, 643-44 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that class
members in a state class action who commenced a separate federal class action were precluded
when the state class action won the race to settlement); Rhonda Wasserman, Dueling Class Actions,
80 B.U. L. REv. 461, 462 (2000) (noting that dueling class actions are "rampant" and discussing the
pressure to settle first on the part of plaintiffs attorneys). Although its reasoning is suspect, one
court has held that a class-certification order in a mandatory class action effectively bars separate
actions involving the same claims, but has further held that this bar violates the Anti-Injunction Act,
28 U.S.C. § 2283 (2000), when applied to cases filed in state court. In re Fed. Skywalk Cases, 680
F.2d 1175, 1180, 1183 (8th Cir. 1982); cf Cooper v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Richmond, 467 U.S.
867, 880 (1984) (holding that the individual claims of class members not encompassed within the
class allegations are not precluded by the class judgment).
54. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B)(v). Because (b)(1)(A), (b)(1)(B), and (b)(2) class actions
lack a comparable opt-out right, they are often called "mandatory" class actions. See Ortiz v.
Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 833 n.13 (1999) (contrasting (b)(1) class actions' lack of opt-out or
notice rights to (b)(3) class actions, which include these rights). Courts have on rare occasion
nonetheless fashioned an off-book, opt-out right for class members in mandatory class actions when
an opt-out right would not create the types of harm that the (b)(1) and (b)(2) class actions were
meant to avoid. See, e.g., Eubanks v. Billington, 110 F.3d 87, 94-95 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (holding that
courts have discretion to fashion opt-outs in (b)(1) and (b)(2) class actions when necessary to
"protect the rights of individual class members"); County of Suffolk v. Long Island Lighting Co.,
907 F.2d 1295, 1302 (2d Cir. 1990) ("Rule 23 does authorize a district court to allow a class
member to opt out of a [(b)(1) action] under some circumstances .... "); cf Phillips Petroleum Co.
v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 811 n.3 (1986) (leaving open the question of whether mandatory class
actions are consistent with the Due Process Clause).
55. Cf 29 U.S.C. § 216 (2000) (providing an opt-in process for Fair Labor Standards Act class
actions); John Bronsteen & Owen Fiss, The Class Action Rule, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1419,
1446-47 (2003) (arguing that class members should be required to opt into a settlement class).
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actions,56 Rule 23's sacrifice of the plaintiffs autonomy to make self-
regarding joinder choices is less dramatic than it might initially appear.
The second way in which class actions retain an important egoist cast is
this simple, and often overlooked, fact: No one is required to bring a case as
a class action. Rather, the decision to seek class treatment lies in the unfet-
tered discretion of the class representative and class counsel. The class
representative and class counsel can make this choice for any of a number of
reasons. Perhaps the representative is virtuous, and wishes to assume the
mantle of disinterested and benevolent leadership. Perhaps the representative
operates from a sense of duty to take no more than a fair share of a
defendant's assets or to treat other claimants as equals. Perhaps she is
altruistic, and wants to advance the interests of others above her own. Per-
haps she is utilitarian, and believes that class treatment will result in the
highest net gain to herself and to others. Or perhaps-and here is the rub-
she is an egoist, whose only interest is advancing her own interests and who
sees class treatment as the best way to do so.
Indeed, in a number of situations, class treatment can serve a litigant's
private interests better than individual litigation. For example, suppose that
the plaintiffs claim were worth only $25; the costs of prosecuting the claim
would far exceed the recovery, and a self-interested plaintiff will not pursue
the claim. But if she could pool her claim with those of thousands of other
similarly situated victims, the plaintiff could spread the costs of litigation and
make the suit worthwhile. Likewise, even if a plaintiff has an independently
viable claim (say, for $100,000), the claim might be weak. Joining her claim
with those of others might improve the probability of recovery, 57 and thus
increase the expected settlement value of her suit. Or perhaps, a class repre-
sentative might hope for a premium, above her expected recovery, for her
service as the class representative. 58 Another example in which a plaintiff
might use class treatment for personal gain occurs when the plaintiff fears
56. See WILLGING ET AL., supra note 51, at 21 (stating that 61% of the class actions in four data
sets were certified under Rule 23(b)(3)).
57. For experimental data suggesting that aggregation with other claims increases the likelihood
of recovery on a weak claim, see Horowitz & Bordens, Aggregation, supra note 25, at 226. The
data add fuel to the claim that class actions are a form of legalized blackmail that extorts large
recoveries for frivolous cases. See In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1298-99 (7th
Cir. 1995) (endorsing the view that "settlements induced by a small probability of an immense
judgment in a class action [are] 'blackmail settlements').
58. "Premium" is a neutral word. Sometimes courts award appropriate compensation to class
representatives "for time spent meeting with class members, monitoring cases, or responding to
discovery." MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 21.62, at 317 n.971 (2004); Romero
v. Producers Dairy Foods, Inc., No. I:05CV0484(DLB), 2007 WL 3492841 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 14,
2007) (approving $7,000 in premiums to two class representatives for their activities). But the
premium can also be a sweetheart deal for the class representative, who collusively accepts a large
payment in return for agreeing to settle the claims of class members for pennies on the dollar. See
WILLG1NG ET AL., supra note 51, at 26 (finding that awards to class representatives occurred in a
substantial minority of cases, with a median award of under $3,000 in three districts and $7,500 in a
fourth); supra note 5 and accompanying text.
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that later litigation by other plaintiffs might effectively undo a remedy that
the plaintiff wishes to achieve. By forcing them into a case that she controls,
the class representative effectively binds these plaintiffs to the judgment that
she prefers. 59  As a final example, the plaintiff might wish to retain an
effective, but pricey, counsel, who (with a self-interested eye comparing the
size of the fee to the opportunity costs of forsaking other legal work) will
agree to take the case only if it holds the promise of the hefty fee award that a
class action might generate.6 °
In each of these examples, the egoist representative is willing to bring a
class action principally to advance her own interests. The final example also
interjects the possibility of an egoist class counsel. In these cases, neither the
class representative nor the class counsel is necessarily hostile to the interests
of class members.61 The problem is that egoist representatives and counsel
are ultimately indifferent to the interests of those whom they represent-and
that indifference creates the risk that, when it is no longer convenient to ad-
vance the interests of others, the self-interested representative or counsel will
abandon those interests.
Thus arises the great structural dilemma of the American class action.
As a general matter, the American litigation system expects, and even extols,
self-interested behavior. Because of the harm that this autonomy creates in
some cases of widespread wrongdoing, Rule 23 requires class members to
give up a measure of that autonomy. What they get in return are a class rep-
resentative and a class counsel that might be guided by the very self-interest
59. For instance, in Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989), the Court allowed white employees
to file a subsequent lawsuit seeking to challenge a hard-fought affirmative-action consent decree
that African-American employees had procured. Id. at 758-59. Had the African-American
employees joined the white employees as members of the class, they might have been able to bind
the white employees to the outcome they preferred. Another example is Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S.
32 (1940), in which a class representative sought to bind all property owners to the determination
that the class representative favored-that a particular covenant was valid and enforceable. See
infra notes 66-77 and accompanying text. A third example involves one set of plaintiffs who want
an injunction establishing one type of medical-monitoring system to detect future health
consequences from a defendant's product, while another set of plaintiffs prefer a different system.
If separate cases were brought, the defendant might not be able to comply with both injunctions. Cf
In re Telectronics Pacing Sys., 172 F.R.D. 271, 284-85 (S.D. Ohio 1997) (describing this
possibility as a reason to certify a class under Rule 23(b)(l)(A)). If the later injunction takes
precedence, a harm would befall the original plaintiff, who would find the earlier judgment
effectively overridden.
60. Again, I describe counsel's motivation to obtain a large fee neutrally. On the one hand,
counsel might work hard to advance the interests of the class and enhance their recovery, thus
earning a large fee. On the other hand, class counsel might collude with the defendant, selling out
the class by agreeing to nominal individual recoveries in return for a very large fee. Compare 28
U.S.C. §§ 1711-1715 (2006) (banning certain coupon settlements), with WILLGING ET AL., supra
note 51, at 68-69 (finding little evidence that class members received only trivial benefits in relation
to attorneys fees).
61. Egoists can advance the interests of others when those interests enhance (or at least do not
impede) the probability of realizing of their own interests. See supra note 32 and accompanying
text.
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toward their positions-and indifference toward the positions of others-that
class members have been required to sacrifice.
C. The Requirement ofAdequate Representation
The bridge spanning the gulf between the interests of class members
and the actions of the class representative and class counsel is the doctrine of
adequate representation. The doctrine handles two distinct problems, one of
incompetence and one of indifference. "Incompetence" concerns class repre-
sentatives and class counsel who sincerely (whether for virtuous,
deontological, altruistic, or utilitarian reasons) want to represent the interests
of class members, but are incapable of effectively doing so because of insuf-
ficient financing, experience, talent, probity, or mental capacity.
"Indifference" concerns egoist class representatives and class counsel who
are willing to represent the interests of class members only to the extent that
such representations serve their own interests.
62
The desire to address these problems does not, however, fully specify
the content of the doctrine. Although class actions have ancient roots, shap-
ing the contours of adequate representation is a fairly recent phenomenon.63
The phrase shows up in the 1938 version of Rule 23. 64 Before then, it was
subsumed within the idea that class actions were maintainable when the rep-
resentative's claim was one of "common interest" (or "general interest") to a
62. I use "indifference" as an umbrella term to describe two different possibilities. The first is
true indifference; the class representative and class counsel do not care one way or the other about
the interests of those they represent, except to the extent that such interests are useful to advancing
their own interests. The second is actual hostility, in which promoting the interests of some or all
class members will injure the interests of the class representative or class counsel. Cases of hostility
are rare, but they exist. See supra note 57; infra notes 104-07 and accompanying text; infra text
accompanying notes 119, 134. Because they present the same analytical problem-an
unwillingness at some point to advance the interests of class members-I consider the situations
together.
63. See generally STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION TO THE
MODERN CLASS ACTION (1987) (describing the emergence, from its medieval roots, of the
twentieth-century class action, which for the first time clearly operated on a "congruence of
interest" model).
64. See FED. R. CIv. P. 23(a), 308 U.S. 689 (1939) (revised 1966) (permitting a class action
when, among other things, a class representative "will fairly insure the adequate representation of
all"). Cases before the 1930s tended not to use the phrase "adequate representation" or variants like
"adequacy of representation." The earliest use of the phrase that I could find was in 1889. See
Lancashire Ins. Co. v. Maxwell, 5 N.Y.S. 399, 401 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1889) (stating that according to
New York's rules of civil procedure, one prerequisite of aggregate suits is that the plaintiffs "may
be adequately and efficiently represented by one or more of their number less than the whole"). The
earliest federal reference-and an ambiguous one at that-was in 1912. See Carpenter v.
Knollwood Cemetery, 198 F. 297, 300 (D. Mass. 1912) (citing 1 ROGER FOSTER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE 317 (4th ed. 1909)) (asserting that one trustee is held "adequately to represent" the rest of
the trustees in a case involving a deed that secured the rights of real property in a large number of
beneficiaries).
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group of parties too numerous to join.65 But we can trace the rise of the
modem concept of adequate representation to 1940, with Hansberry v. Lee. 66
Hansberry involved a racially restrictive covenant that was arguably
invalid.67 But in a prior class action, Burke v. Kleiman,68 in which a class of
signatory landowners sued one of their number who had violated the
covenant, the class and the defendant stipulated, and the court found, that the
covenant was valid.69 When an African-American family, the Hansberrys,
bought another property subject to the same covenant, one of their defenses
against an eviction proceeding brought by a class of landowners was the
covenant's invalidity. 70 The plaintiffs argued that the Hansberrys were pre-
cluded from raising the argument-that the question of validity had been
decided in Burke, and that, as successors in interest to a class member in that
action, the Hansberrys were bound by that decision.71  The Illinois courts
agreed,72 but the U.S. Supreme Court reversed.73
The basis for the Supreme Court's decision was the inadequacy of the
representation that the Hansberrys received in Burke. The Court explained:
It is familiar doctrine of the federal courts that members of a class
not present as parties to the litigation may be bound by the judgment
where they are in fact adequately represented by parties who are
present ....
It is one thing to say that some members of a class may represent
other members in a litigation where the sole and common interest of
the class in the litigation, is either to assert a common right or to chal-
lenge an asserted obligation. It is quite another to hold that all those
who are free alternatively either to assert rights or to challenge them
are of a single class .... Such a selection of representatives for pur-
poses of litigation, whose substantial interests are not necessarily or
even probably the same as those whom they are deemed to represent,
does not afford that protection to absent parties which due process
requires.... Apart from the opportunities it would afford for the
65. See Beatty v. Kurtz, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 566, 566 (1829) (recognizing that "this is one of those
cases in which certain persons.., having a common interest, may sue in behalf of themselves and
others.., for purposes common to all, and beneficial to all"); Frederick v. Douglas County, 71
N.W. 798, 799 (Wis. 1897) (quoting a statute authorizing suit "when the question is one of common
or general interest of many persons").
66. For a discussion of the facts and historical context of the case, see Jay Tidmarsh, The Story
of Hansberry: The Rise of the Modern Class Action, in CIVIL PROCEDURE STORIES 233 (Kevin M.
Clermont ed., 2d ed. 2008).
67. Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 37-38 (1940).
68. 277 Ill. App. 519 (App. Ct. 1934).
69. Id at 522; see also Tidmarsh, supra note 66, at 243-44.
70. Hansberry, 311 U.S. at 38; see also Tidmarsh, supra note 66, at 262.
71. Hansberry, 311 U.S. at 38; see also Tidmarsh, supra note 66, at 262.
72. Hansberry, 311 U.S. at 38; see also Tidmarsh, supra note 66, at 271.
73. Hansberry, 311 U.S. at 38.
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fraudulent and collusive sacrifice of the rights of absent parties, we
think that the representation in this case no more satisfies the require-
ments of due process than a trial by a judicial officer who is in such
situation that he may have an interest in the outcome of the litigation
in conflict with that of the litigants.
74
Sensibly enough, the Hansberry Court thought that the representative in
Burke could not adequately represent both the interests of those home owners
who, like the representative herself, wanted to enforce the covenant and the
interests of those home owners who, like the Hansberrys, wanted not to en-
force the covenant:
[T]hose signers or their successors who are interested in challenging
the validity of the agreement and resisting its performance are not of
the same class in the sense that their interests are identical so that any
group who had elected to enforce rights conferred by the agreement
could be said to be acting in the interest of any others who were free
to deny its obligation.
75
Hansberry presented a case of indifference rather than a case of
incompetence. The self-interest of the class representative in Burke was to
enforce the restrictive covenant. The best way to do so was to bring a class
action, which bound every signatory to the determination that the covenant
was enforceable. The class representative and class counsel 76 were at best
indifferent, and more likely were hostile, to the interests of those members of
the class that had no interest in enforcing the covenant.77
Thus, Hansberry harbored no illusions about the goodness of humanity;
it accepted the reality that class representatives were going to act self-
interestedly--or egoistically. Its solution was to require a tight alignment of
the interests of class representatives and the interests of class members. Even
if class representatives were self-interested, the rising tide of their self-
74. Id. at 42-45 (citations omitted).
75. Id. at 44.
76. Although Hansberry focused on the deficiencies of the class representative in Burke, the
defendants in Hansberry also alleged that the class counsel in Burke was deficient. Brief of
Petitioners at 45, Hansberry, 311 U.S. 32 (No. 29). In particular, the defendants argued that class
counsel colluded with a willing defense counsel to enter a fraudulent stipulation that the covenant
was valid. Id. This allegation of collusion was never proven, although it formed the backdrop for
the Supreme Court's decision. See Hansberry, 311 U.S. at 45 (noting "the opportunities" that the
representation of conflicting interests "would afford for the fraudulent and collusive sacrifice of the
rights of absent parties"); Tidmarsh, supra note 66, at 267-70.
77. Presumably, all signatories to the covenant had an interest in its enforcement when they
signed the agreement during 1927 and 1928. But those interests began to change over time, and the
covenant ran with each property for twenty-five years. Tidmarsh, supra note 66, at 239. The
combination of the Great Depression, the changing racial composition of the surrounding
neighborhoods, white flight, and the ready supply of African-American families willing to pay a
premium for housing made some of the original signatories regret their decisions. See id. at 240
("The inexorable law of supply and demand has already washed away restrictive covenants in other
areas, and it seemed unlikely that the Association could keep its homeowners from eventually
breaking rank."). In addition, some new owners of the property likely had different attitudes toward
the covenants than the original owners. Nagareda, supra note 7, at 288.
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interest would inevitably lift the boats of class members with similar
interests. If the interests were not so aligned, however, the class action could
not be maintained.
Hansberry's rendering of adequate representation has loomed over
class-action practice ever since. Most evidently, it influences the structure of
Rules 23(a) and (g). Read together, these rules establish two fundamental
requirements for all class actions. The first is that a class action be an effi-
cient vehicle for handling claims.78  The second-and here is Hansberry's
influence-is that the class representative and class counsel adequately rep-
resent the interests of class members. 79 Hansberry has also driven the case
law, which, when deciding questions of adequacy, often focuses on the pres-
ence (or absence) of the Hansberry evils: conflicts of interest within the class
or collusion by the class representative or class counsel. 80 The Supreme
Court itself has returned only once to the identity-of-interest construct
Hansberry created-and has reinforced it. In Amchem Products, Inc. v.
78. In particular, the requirements of numerosity (Rule 23(a)(1)), commonality (Rule 23(a)(2)),
and to some extent typicality (Rule 23(a)(3)) make sure that joint treatment advances economy and
efficiency. Numerosity ensures the possibility of realizing economies of scale. See Robidoux v.
Celani, 987 F.2d 931, 936 (2d Cir. 1993) (stating that "judicial economy arising from the avoidance
of a multiplicity of actions" is a relevant factor in determining numerosity). Commonality and
typicality ensure that a common issue exists and that noncommon issues will not sidetrack the
case-thus helping to prevent expensive case-by-case relitigation of common questions. See Gen.
Tel. Co. of the Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157 n.13 (1982) (explaining that commonality and
typicality help ensure that maintaining the class action is economical and that the interests of the
class members are interrelated so that they "will be fairly and adequately protected in their
absence"); THOMAS D. ROWE, JR. ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 648-49 (2d ed. 2008) (stating that
commonality requires that the class members have common factual or legal issues, because
otherwise "it is difficult to imagine how the class representative could adequately represent the
divergent interests of the members," while typicality requires that the class representatives have
claims that are typical of the class, because otherwise "reason exists to doubt the vigor of the
representatives' advocacy and the efficiency of the class proceeding").
79. Most directly, Rule 23(a)(4) requires that the class representative "fairly and adequately
protect the interests of the class," and Rules 23(g)(l)(A) and (B) require a court to consider various
matters "pertinent to counsel's ability to fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class."
FED. R. CIv. P. 23(a)(4), 23(g)(1). But the demand for adequate representation runs throughout
Rules 23(a) and (g), which list the prerequisites for class representatives and class counsel. Other
requirements in Rule 23(a)-for instance, that the class representative be a "member[ ] of a class,"
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a), that "there are questions of law or fact common to the class," FED. R. Civ. P.
23(a)(2), and that the class representative's claims be "typical of the claims.., of the class," FED.
R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3)-also seek to assure a close alignment of interests among the class
representative, the class counsel, and the class members. See also Falcon, 457 U.S. at 157-58 n. 13
(discussing how Rule 23(a) requires that the class representative's claim be similar to the interests
of the class and that class counsel has no conflicts of interest).
80. See, e.g., Mirfasihi v. Fleet Mortgage Corp., 450 F.3d 745, 748 (7th Cir. 2006)
(emphasizing the district court's role in overseeing proposed class settlements in order to ensure that
class counsel has no conflicts of interests with the class members); 7A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET
AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 1768-1769 (3d ed. 2005) (compiling case law on
what constitutes coextensive, antagonistic, and conflicting interests between class representatives
and the class).
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Windsor,81 the Court held that, in settling the claims of victims of the
defendants' wrongdoing, class representatives with present claims against the
defendants could not adequately represent class members whose claims had
not yet matured-at least when the settlement that the class representatives
were advocating failed to include terms as favorable for future claimants as
those that the present claimants received.82 Nor could those representatives
agree to settle the valuable consortium claims of some class members for
nothing, as the settlement in Amchem did.83
The development of the adequacy doctrine from Hansberry through
Amchem can be critiqued on a number of grounds. The first is its failure to
develop a clear test for incompetence, 84 or to suggest how that test might be
linked to the test for indifference. 85 In determining competence, courts usu-
ally examine questions of physical and financial capacity 86 --logical enough
81. 521 U.S. 591 (1997). Without extended discussion, the Court has also recognized the
principle of adequate representation in a few other cases. See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts,
472 U.S. 797, 812 (1985) (stating that due process requires that the plaintiff "adequately represent"
the class members' interests); Falcon, 457 U.S. at 157 n.13 (mentioning the "adequacy-of-
representation requirement" that ensures that class representatives have no conflicts of interest).
82. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 626-27 (1997). Amchem also identified the
array of illnesses and medical conditions of the class members as another reason to doubt the
adequacy of representation. Id. In addition, Amchem involved claims of collusion between class
counsel and defense counsel to sell out the interests of absent class members. See Georgine v.
Amchem Prods., Inc., 157 F.R.D. 246, 306 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (mem.), vacated, 83 F.3d 610 (3d Cir.
1996), aff'd sub nom. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997) (finding that claims
that the "class action was the product of collusion, i.e., that Class Counsel 'sold out' the interests of
the class members" were not supported by the evidence); Koniak, supra note 2, at 1118 (criticizing
Georgine's collusion standard as so high that it "virtually guarantees a finding of no collusion").
The district court found that such collusion did not exist. Georgine, 157 F.R.D. at 305-10. Neither
the court of appeals nor the Supreme Court reached the question.
83. 521 U.S. at 627.
84. In addition to using Rules 23(a)(4) and (g) to determine questions of indifference to class
members' interests, courts use these rules to examine the question of capacity. Indeed, some courts
interpret Rule 23(a)(3) as the place to explore questions of conflict or collusion, and Rule 23(a)(4)
as the place to examine the question of the capacity of the class representative to represent the class.
See, e.g., In re Am. Med. Sys., Inc., 75 F.3d 1069, 1082-83 (6th Cir. 1996) (using Rule 23(a)(3) to
evaluate whether the class representative's interests were aligned with the class, and using Rule
23(a)(4) to evaluate whether the class representative had the mental capacity to represent the class).
Likewise, the criteria for class counsel outlined in Rule 23(g)(l)(A) principally explore counsel's
financial, experiential, and legal capacity to represent the class.
85. The Supreme Court has lumped questions of competence and questions of conflict of
interest into Rule 23(a)(4) without any attempt to explain their connection. Amchem, 521 U.S. at
626 n.20; Falcon, 457 U.S. at 157 n.13.
86. On the physical and mental competence of class representatives, see Am. Med. Sys., 75 F.3d
at 1083; and Murray v. New Cingular Wireless Servs., Inc., 232 F.R.D. 295, 299-300 (N.D. 111.
2005). Courts have tended to find that the financial capacity of class representatives is irrelevant.
See In re Intel Corp. Microprocessor Antitrust Litig., 526 F. Supp. 2d 461, 464 (D. Del. 2007)
("[T]he financial status of class representatives is irrelevant to class certification issues and not
discoverable .... "). But courts do focus on the financial resources of counsel. See FED. R. Civ. P.
23(g)(I)(A)(iv) (stating that, in appointing class counsel, the court must consider the resources the
counsel will commit to the representation); Doe v. Karadzic, 176 F.R.D. 458, 462 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)
(determining that counsel was qualified to represent the class based on credentials and adequate
resources).
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requirements, but ones that are hard to tease out of a doctrine concerned with
conflicts and collusion.
That disconnection is itself a small point. But it feeds into two larger
problems in the progression from Hansberry to Amchem. The first is the
movement from dichotomous to polycentric interests. In Hansberry there
were essentially only two possible positions that class members might have
wished to take: either the covenant was valid and therefore enforceable, or
the covenant was invalid and therefore unenforceable. In a world with such
dichotomous choices, it is easy to recognize conflicts of interest. In Amchem,
however, the interests were far more complex and diffuse. The factual and
legal positions of class members varied considerably, and class members had
a range of possible interests other than the dichotomous poles of "I favor set-
tlement" and "I favor no settlement." Hansberry's identity-of-interests test
works best when the interests in litigation break into readily opposing, clear-
cut camps; Amchem shows that interests are often shades of grey. Because it
involved only two dichotomous positions, Hansberry never needed to specify
exactly how tightly aligned the interests had to be in order for a class repre-
sentative to be regarded as adequate. Amchem might have done so, but the
majority ducked the issue.87 So we do not know whether a representative can
stand in only for those claimants whose interests are exactly the same shade
of grey, or, if not, how close the shades of grey must be. Hansberry's test for
adequacy seems poorly suited for a world that involves a multiplicity of in-
terests among class members.
Second, and relatedly, in the vocabulary of ethics, the class action is a
consequentialist-specifically, a utilitarian--device, which is principally
concerned with preventing certain harms to potential class members, to the
defendant, or to society. 88 A doctrine requiring avoidance of conflicts of
interest or collusion has a deontological ring to it; it is a duty-based
requirement that must be satisfied regardless of the consequences. In
Hansberry, it was not clear that adequate representation was a deontological
principle. On one view, Hansberry "constitutionalized" adequate represen-
tation to achieve a social good; it allowed an attack on a racially restrictive
covenant to go forward. The petitioners in Hansberry had asked the
Supreme Court to declare all racially restrictive covenants invalid, making
the very arguments against restrictive covenants that the Court would adopt
eight years later in Shelley v. Kraemer.89 In 1940, the Supreme Court was
87. At one point Amchem appeared to suggest that the settlement could have been saved if
subclasses composed of members with comparable interests had been certified, instead of one large
class that threw together people with varying interests. 521 U.S. at 627. But this suggestion came
only in the Court's quotation of a Second Circuit opinion, and in any event the Court did not make
clear how many subclasses-or with what array of interests-would have been acceptable.
88. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
89. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
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not yet willing to go that far;90 adequacy of representation thus became a
convenient vehicle that gave the Hansberry petitioners the chance to contest
a particular covenant without the Court embroiling itself in far trickier con-
stitutional and political questions whose outcome would have been in
considerable doubt.
9 1
By the time of Amchem, however, any sense that adequate
representation was a utilitarian doctrine crafted with an eye toward achieving
a good outcome was gone. The majority's opinion both opened and closed
with a lament about the social and judicial ills that asbestos litigation had
caused.92  It recognized that the Amchem settlement might have alleviated
those ills in some significant measure.93 Despite these benefits, however, the
Court felt constrained to find a lack of adequate representation without
weighing the benefits of settlement against the costs of less than ideal
representation94-clearly a nonconsequentialist approach.
The point of this critique is not to catch the Court in a bit of
philosophical incoherence. Rather, it is to show that the doctrine of adequate
representation-at least if it is understood to require strict avoidance of con-
flicts of interest or collusion-has drifted from the moorings of the law to
which it was attached. Class actions are designed to prevent harm to simi-
larly situated claimants, to defendants, or to society. Class actions also
impose costs, 95 including two costs-depressed judgment (or settlement) val-
ues for class members and a concomitant loss in optimal deterrence of the
defendant96-- that can occur when conflicts of interest or collusion make
representation inadequate. Viewed consequentially, representation should be
deemed inadequate only when the marginal cost of a more imperfect
90. One of the Court's difficulties was that, in the recent past, it had dismissed an appeal of a
case challenging the constitutionality and legality of racially restrictive covenants for want of a
substantial federal question. Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323, 331-32 (1926).
91. For this interpretation of Hansberry, see YEAZELL, supra note 63, at 235-36.
92. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 597-99, 628-29.
93. Id. at 628-29; see id. at 629 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("[Tihe need for settlement in this mass
tort case, with hundreds of thousands of lawsuits, is greater than the Court's opinion suggests.").
94. This turn seems particularly out of place because Hansberry v. Lee located the adequacy-of-
representation doctrine in the Due Process Clause. 311 U.S. 32, 45 (1940); see also id. at 42
(stating that the due process and full faith and credit clauses shape the doctrine). Today, due
process is mainly regarded as a consequentialist doctrine, balancing the costs of greater procedural
protections against their benefits. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976)
(identifying three factors the Court considers when determining whether a government action is in
harmony with procedural due process: (1) the private interest that will be affected by the state
action; (2) the effectiveness of the proposed procedural requirements in safeguarding against due
process deprivations; and (3) the burdens such procedural requirements would place upon the
government). For further discussion, see infra notes 193-94 and accompanying text.
95. One example is the potential cost of inaccuracy due to an increased probability of recovery
from class aggregation. See supra note 28.
96. On the deterrence effect of class actions, see David Rosenberg, Class Actions for Mass
Torts: Doing Individual Justice by Collective Means, 62 IND. L.J. 561, 570 (1987), which explains
that adhering to a disaggregative dispute-resolution system with regard to mass torts reduces the
deterrence effect that threatened liability normally has on defendants.
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representation, when added to the other costs of class treatment, exceeds the
costs to similarly situated claimants, to the defendant, or to society that non-
class litigation would impose. But this is not the inquiry in which Amchem
97
engages.
Finally, treating adequate representation as an absolute bar to class
treatment ignores a critical fact. Conflicts of interest are not occasional oc-
currences involving a shady class counsel or two. Rather, as I describe in the
next Part, conflicts of interest are built into the very fabric of our present
class-action regime. If we are serious about enforcing as tight an alignment
of interests as Hansberry and Amchem seem to require, we must abandon
Rule 23, or rewrite it.
II. Adequacy's Conundrum: The Inevitability of Conflicts of Interest in
American Class Actions
The four circumstances in which Rule 23(b) permits class treatment
almost invariably bring into a single class people with antagonistic interests.
This Part details the reasons for this perhaps surprising conclusion. In brief,
the four class-action scenarios described in Rule 23(b) seek to prevent harms
to other claimants (Rules 23(b)(1)(A) and, to some extent, 23(b)(2)), to de-
fendants (Rules 23(b)(1)(B) and, to some extent, 23(b)(2)), or to society
(Rule 23(b)(3)). To minimize these harms, people with diverging interests
must be placed side-by-side in the class, and those interests must be adjusted
one against the other.
The observation that conflicts inhere in many class actions is hardly
new. 98 This Part, however, is the first systematic effort to prove why that
observation is correct. In doing so, this proof raises the disconcerting possi-
bility that virtually all class actions exceed the due process strictures that
Hansberry imposes on adequate representation, and are therefore unconstitu-
tional.
97. Had Amchem undertaken such an inquiry, it is not clear what the outcome would have been.
The settlement contained complex provisions that tended to set awards around the historical
averages for asbestos settlements, but also tended to suppress high-end awards and made no
allowance for inflation, thus, over time, suppressing all awards beneath real-dollar historical
averages. There is some reason to believe that the willingness of class counsel to accept a low
settlement was related to the arguable conflicts of interest that they had, both in simultaneously
representing individual claimants and class claimants and in simultaneously representing present
class claimants and future class claimants. For a full description of the settlement's terms, see JAY
TIDMARSH, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., MASS TORT SETTLEMENT CLASS ACTIONS: FIVE CASE STUDIES
51-54 (1998), available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/Tidmarsh.pdf/Sfile/Tidmarsh.
pdf.
98. See, e.g., Silver & Baker, supra note 10, at 1468 ("Conflicts of interest and associated
tradeoffs among plaintiffs are an unavoidable part of all group lawsuits and all group settlements.").
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A. Conflicts of Interest when Nonclass Treatment Will Harm Absent Class
Members: Rule 23(b)(1)(B) and Rule 23(b)(2) Classes
Begin with the problem of harm to the absent class members-that their
interests will be disposed of, or at least substantially impaired "as a practical
matter," in the absence of class certification.99 The two paradigms for this
type of harm are a case seeking a remedy such as a declaration of rights or an
injunction, and a case involving a limited fund. In the former, if the
defendant's conduct threatens widespread future harm, a court often cannot
readily confine the remedy just to the plaintiff;100 thus, the first plaintiff to
secure a declaration or injunction effectively makes it difficult for similarly
situated claimants to obtain relief more suited to their interests. In the latter,
because the fund is insufficient to satisfy all claimants fully, early-filing
plaintiffs receive full value for their claims, leaving little or no money for
equally deserving, later litigants. In both situations, (b)(1)(B) and (b)(2)
class actions promise equitable treatment for all members of the class. 101
By definition, however, the self-interested plaintiff could care less about
equitable treatment. She is interested in getting as much of the pie for herself
as possible; she is under no obligation to102-and therefore will not-seek
class treatment unless the class action helps her achieve her goals. It is there-
fore tempting to dismiss the problem of self-interested class representatives
in this context; presumably, the only class representatives who will bring
such cases as class actions must care about equity among claimants, and
therefore (as long as they are competent) they will be adequate
representatives. Such a view, however, is badly mistaken, for sometimes
certification of a (b)(1)(B) or (b)(2) class is an advantage for a self-interested
class representative. The reason that a self-interested plaintiff will wish to
bring a declaratory or injunctive claim as a class action is that as class
representative, she gets to control the arguments about the nature of the
remedy to tailor the remedy to her own interests, and bind other potential
litigants that might have preferred a different remedy to the judgment-thus
preventing them from engaging in subsequent litigation that might undermine
her preferred remedy.
The reasons that a self-interested plaintiff will seek class treatment in
the limited-fund situation (or in a situation in which it is unlikely that the
plaintiff will get the injunctive tailoring she wants) are less evident, but they
99. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(B).
100. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory committee's note (1966).
101. The harm that these rules prevent is the failure of the autonomy-centered joinder approach
of Rule 20(a) to provide equitable treatment to potential litigants who are not joined. Such a harm
is not necessarily a social harm. To use the limited-fund example, deterrence theory is indifferent as
to whether the fund is given to one person or one thousand; in either event, the defendant will be
equally deterred. See David Rosenberg, Decoupling Deterrence and Compensation Functions in
Mass Tort Class Actions for Future Loss, 88 VA. L. REV. 1871, 1892 (2002) ("How damages are
distributed among plaintiffs.., is generally... irrelevant to achieving deterrence.").
102. See supra text accompanying notes 57-61.
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exist. To use a limited-fund hypothetical, assume that the defendant has
control of $1 million in assets, the legitimate claims of 100 plaintiffs against
this fund amount to $2 million, and each plaintiff has an identical claim for
$20,000. If the first plaintiff sues individually, she will recover the full value
of her claim-20,000. The same will be true of the next forty-nine
plaintiffs. But at that point the fund dries up, and as a practical matter, the
claims of those last fifty potential plaintiffs are worthless. If the first plaintiff
brings a class action, however, she will get only $10,000-a loss of $10,000
that would seem to prevent self-interested plaintiffs from seeking class
treatment. 1
03
But not always. In four scenarios a self-interested plaintiff will seek
class certification:
0 Scenario One: The increase in the chance of success plus the
ability to spread costs and attorneys fees makes class treatment
worthwhile. For instance, suppose that the plaintiff stands a 40%
chance of winning $20,000 in an individual suit, and it will cost her
$7,000 in fees and costs if she wins (and nothing if she loses). The
expected value of her suit is $5,200. Assume that with class
treatment, however, the odds of victory go up to 75% 104 and that the
plaintiff's share of the fees and costs, which can now be spread among
all 100 class members, falls to $3,000105 if there is a victory (and noth-
ing if she loses). Now the self-interested plaintiffs expected recovery
is $5,250, and she will seek class treatment. 0 6
103. The defendant is also unlikely to seek class certification, because the defendant is likely to
be indifferent about who receives the $1 million and probably prefers to stave off the day of
bankruptcy or asset depletion as long as possible.
104. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
105. Although the $3,000 figure for litigation costs might seem high, class actions often involve
expenses-such as the time spent discovering and briefing the class-certification motion and the
cost of notifying the class in the event of a settlement-that would not be incurred in individual
litigation. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(1) (requiring an attempt to notify class members that will be
bound by the settlement); WILLGING ET AL., supra note 51, at 68-69 (noting that the median
attorneys fee in class actions was 27%-30%). As the per-plaintiff costs fall, the incentive of the
self-interested plaintiff to seek class certification grows.
106. Class actions allow a class representative to reduce the risk of exposure to litigation costs
in one particular fashion. Although the rule is often honored in the breach, traditional ethical theory
made a litigant responsible for payment of litigation expenses; the attorney cannot bear those costs.
MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-103(B) (1988). But see MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 1.8(e)(1) (2008) (permitting a lawyer to make the repayment of costs contingent on
the outcome of the case). In class actions, however, a number of jurisdictions have held that the
class representative is not responsible for the full costs of litigation. See Rand v. Monsanto Co., 926
F.2d 596, 600-01 (7th Cir. 1991) (refusing to apply DR 5-103(B) in a federal class action, and
refusing to find that the class representative's unwillingness to bear all the expenses of litigation
made the representative inadequate under Rule 23(a)(4)). See generally Geoffrey P. Miller,
Payment of Expenses in Securities Class Actions: Ethical Dilemmas, Class Counsel, and
Congressional Intent, 22 REv. LITIG. 557 (2003) (analyzing ethical and Rule 23 issues concerning
lawyers that advance the costs of litigation). Therefore, in the minority of jurisdictions that adhere
to DR 5-103(B) for individual lawsuits, the legal exposure of the class representative for the costs of
litigation is theoretically less.
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0 Scenario Two: The claimants do not have identical remedial
claims. The self-interested class representative might hope that, after
using the class's number to help establish liability, she can effectively
denigrate or devalue the claims of fellow class members, thus getting a
larger share of the judgment. For instance, assume that class treatment
raises the chance of recovery only to 70%, but the class representative
expects to be able to shade the remedial proof to enhance her claim to
$12,000. Still assuming pro rata litigation costs of $3,000, her ex-
pected recovery is $6,300, so she will seek class certification.
* Scenario Three: The self-interested plaintiffs preferred counsel
agrees to take the case only as a class action, so that class treatment
becomes the only viable way to bring suit. For instance, using the
numbers described in the first example, the plaintiff might expect that
retaining the preferred counsel will increase the chance of winning
from 40% to 80%. On these numbers, it is rational for the class repre-
sentative to assent to a class action.
* Scenario Four: The putative class counsel, with an eye only on the
fee award, advises the putative class representative to seek class status
without advising her that she stands to lose money from class
treatment-and the putative representative lacks the legal acumen to
realize that class treatment is not in her best interests.
Whichever reason is at work, class treatment ends up bundling together
plaintiffs whose interests are not aligned. The class representative and the
members of the class are locked in a competition for a limited resource-
whether an injunction that cannot be perfectly tailored to all their interests or
a fund that is insufficient to satisfy fully all their claims. The interests of the
class representative, class counsel, and class members might converge on
certain issues-in particular, on the issue of the defendant's liability.'17 On
the issue of remedy, however, class representatives and class members who
are competing with each other for a resource that cannot fully satisfy all
claimants lack an "identity of interests." Thus, there is reason to doubt that
the self-interested class representative, who wants the relief shaped as fa-
vorably to her interests as possible, will adequately represent the interests of
those with different interests.
True enough, but a doubting Thomas might point to two situations in
which this self-interest will not manifest itself. The first occurs when the
class members do not disagree about either the theory of liability or the na-
ture of the relief they seek. For example, under the relevant law, the choice
might be either injunction X or no injunction; every potential plaintiff wishes
to obtain exactly the same remedy, which will apply to and equally benefit
107. But not always. To the extent that the nature of the defendant's liability determines the
shape of the relief, plaintiffs interested in different relief might not agree on which theory of
liability to pursue.
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all.' 08 Here, our Thomas might rejoin, the rising tide of the plaintiffs self-
interested desire to get injunction X really does lift all class members' boats.
Even in this situation, however, conflict exists. In this example, the only rea-
son that a self-interested putative class representative would seek class
certification is to offload some of the costs of litigation onto class members.
Although it is difficult to have much sympathy for class members who are
hoping to be free riders on an individual suit, the self-interest of class
members-a self-interest that I have not discussed before, but one that exists
every bit as much as the self-interest of the class representative-is not to
certify the case, for class members will be required to pay a pro rata share of
litigation expenses for an injunction that they otherwise would have obtained
for free. We can (and do) ignore the free-rider problem in (b)(1)(B) and
(b)(2) cases, but ignoring it does not mean that the antagonism of interests109
goes away.
The second situation a doubting Thomas might raise involves the use of
subclasses, which Amchem has suggested as a solution to the polycentric in-
terests of class members. 10 The idea of subclasses is to subdivide plaintiffs
108. It is not clear how many cases this hypothetical encompasses. For the sake of argument, I
am willing to admit that some cases fall within this description.
109. Because putative class members cannot opt out of (b)(1)(B) and (b)(2) class actions, see
supra note 54, the free-rider problem cannot be assuaged by allowing class members to exit. It is
interesting to note that the conflict of interest here does not concern the substance of the claim, but
rather the litigation strategy: whether to seek class certification. Neither Hansberry nor Amchem
involved a disagreement over litigation strategy, nor has the Court ever held that disagreements over
strategy are a sufficient reason for finding a conflict of interest. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine that
it would, for then no class action could be certified when any class member objected to certification.
What makes this situation different from a simple disagreement over strategy, however, is the
reason for the disagreement: Class members wish to see the class not certified because they will
obtain a better outcome (i.e., the same injunction at less expense) without certification. Conversely,
the class representative is making herself better off by making class members worse off. In both
Hansberry and Amchem, comparable disagreements over the remedial outcome were sufficient to
find a conflict of interest.
The one situation in which no antagonism appears to exist occurs when it is too costly for any
claimant to bring the injunctive claim on her own. In such a case-the injunctive equivalent of the
"negative-value suit" discussed infra in the text following note 124-it appears to be in every class
member's interest to join the class. Nonetheless, as the discussion of negative-value suits will
show, internal conflicts can arise in this situation. Moreover, unless the expected value of the
injunction is very close to the cost of prosecuting the claim, so that the claim becomes viable only
when litigation costs are spread across every member of the class, the free-rider problem still exists:
An absent class member would prefer for the class definition to be broad enough to spread the
litigation costs among enough people to make the class action viable, but narrow enough to exclude
her. It is also worth noting that determining a lack of conflict by calculating the net effect of a class
action on the interests of the class members is a consequentialist approach to determining conflicts
of interest-precisely the approach that Amchem's deontological analysis eschewed. See Amchem
Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 621 (1997) ("[T]he standards set for the protection of absent
class members serve to inhibit appraisals of the chancellor's foot kind--class certifications
dependent upon the court's gestalt judgment or overarching impression of the settlement's
fairness.").
110. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 627; see FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(5) ("When appropriate, a class may be
divided into subclasses that are each treated as a class under this rule."); see supra note 87 and
accompanying text. Amchem's suggestion was mild: Afier noting that class representatives "served
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into smaller groups, each of which shares an identity of interests. Although
useful in theory, subclassing is far less helpful in practice for two reasons.
First, each subclass must be large enough not to run afoul of the numerosity
requirement"' but still contain within it no remedial antagonism among the
members. Although it is possible to hypothesize such situations,' 2 they are
rare in the real world. Second, subclassing along interest lines institutional-
izes the conflict among competing interests, rather than eliminating it.
Because subclasses are still part of a larger single class, the conflicts among
class members remain.
Third, although separate classes might overcome this problem, it is
tricky to imagine how a court could engineer the filing-and consolidation
into a single litigation-of separate class actions, each of which represents
distinct, conflicting interests. Separate classes or subclasses require multiple
class representatives and multiple class counsel. But separate classes or sub-
classes undercut the incentives for self-interested class representatives and
class counsel to seek certification. Assuming that willing representatives for
multiple classes or subclasses are available (and this is hardly a given), mul-
tiple classes loosen the self-interested class representative's control of the
litigation and her ability to steer the litigation in her favor, thus reducing her
expected recovery from class treatment; multiple representatives further re-
duce the number of people over whom the costs of litigation can be spread,
thus increasing the pro rata costs. In the example above, if separate classing
or subclassing reduces the expected recovery from 75% to 65%, and in-
creases per-person litigation expenses to $500, the expected recovery from
class treatment falls to $6,000-less than the $6,500 that a self-interested
plaintiff might expect from individual treatment. Similarly, assuming that
multiple willing class counsel are available, a self-interested lawyer will re-
alize that successfully settling the case becomes harder with more classes,
and the fee that the counsel can expect will be substantially less than she
could expect in a scenario in which she was the sole lawyer for a larger class.
generally as representative for the whole, not for a separate constituency," it quoted a Second
Circuit decision that suggested subclassing as a solution to the problem of adverse interests within a
settlement class. Amehem, 521 U.S. at 627 (discussing In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 982
F.2d 721, 742-43 (2d Cir. 1992), modified on reh'g sub nom. In re Findley, 993 F.2d 7 (2d Cir.
1993)). The Court never endorsed subclassing directly.
111. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1). In general, a class of 100 or more members meets this
requirement; even smaller numbers can sometimes be satisfactory. See, e.g., Robidoux v. Celani,
987 F.2d 931, 935-36 (2d Cir. 1993) (permitting inexact numbers of a potential class size to satisfy
the numerosity requirement); WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 80, § 1762 (emphasizing that there are no
arbitrary rules establishing a required class size and there only needs to be a showing that joining all
the members is impracticable).
112. For example, in the limited-fund hypothetical discussed supra in note 103 and
accompanying text, rather than individual claimants, each entity with a $20,000 claim could be an
unincorporated association or trust composed of thousands of members. On the further assumption
that the members of each association have no legally cognizable internal conflicts about the proper
distribution of its $20,000 claim, subclasses or separate classes composed of the members of each
association would be numerous enough and also would not be remedially conflicted.
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The class action also loses some of its efficiency due to the cost of multiple
representation. 113  Once separate classes or subclasses are introduced, the
litigation calculus changes, the advantages of individual action become
greater, and the odds that the self-interested class representative and class
counsel will seek class certification falls. Unsurprisingly, separate classes
and subclasses are very uncommon in practice. 114
Therefore, except in those rare cases in which subclassing into smaller
and utterly cohesive groups is a viable option, conflicts of interest inhere in
(b)(1)(B) or (b)(2) classes. These conflicts are less nettlesome if we assume
that the class representative and class counsel are virtuous, principled,
altruistic, or else are committed to maximizing the common good-and, in
addition, that they are competent enough to achieve their goal. But the law
of adequate representation cannot afford to make that assumption, given the
reality that self-interested class representatives and class counsel can also use
class actions to achieve private advantage. Moreover, even selfless class rep-
resentatives and class counsel do not eliminate conflicts within the class; the
conflicts exist, ever tempting the virtuous, the upright, and the altruistic to
cave into abject self-interest.
If we read Hansberry and Amchem strictly, so as to require an identity-
of-interests approach to adequate representation, the unconstitutionality of
the (b)(1)(B) and (b)(2) class actions in nearly every context is a matter of
elementary logic. The only remarkable thing is that the issue has not been
widely noticed in the past.' 15
B. Conflicts of Interest when Nonclass Treatment Will Harm the Defendant:
Rule 23(b) (1) (A) and Rule 23(b)(2) Classes
Next, consider the situation in which the harm that class treatment
alleviates would befall the defendant. Rules 23(b)(1)(A) and 23(b)(2) are the
texts for analysis; the former authorizes a class action when separate actions
by a group of plaintiffs "create a risk" of "inconsistent or varying
113. See Reynolds v. Beneficial Nat'l Bank, 288 F.3d 277, 282 (7th Cir. 2002) (holding that
subclassing was not required, despite a conflict of interest within the class, because of the difficulty
and expense of creating appropriate subclasses).
114. See WILLGING ET AL., supra note 51, at 41-44 (finding no use of issue classes and little
use of subclasses within the four data sets). A hybrid solution often adopted by class counsel in lieu
of subclassing is to constitute a single class with multiple class representatives, each of whom
represents a particular type of injury or claim. In this way, a single counsel can try to represent all
the various permutations of the claim, injury, and circumstance. But instantiating in particular
people the conflicts among class members does not change the fact that conflicts within the class
exist. See Amchem, 521 U.S. at 627 ("Although the named parties alleged a range of complaints,
each served generally as representative for the whole, not for a separate constituency.").
115. Courts have noticed other constitutional issues with either (b)(1)(B) or (b)(2) class actions,
including the arguable due process violation in failing to provide an opt-out right, see Phillips
Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 811-12 & n.3 (1985), and Seventh Amendment issues in
adjudicating injunctive claims when class members might also have monetary claims, see Allison v.
Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 405 (5th Cir. 1998).
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adjudications... that would establish incompatible standards of conduct" for
the defendant," 16 while the latter permits class treatment when the defendant
has acted in a way that makes "final injunctive relief... appropriate."' 17
This language invokes two paradigmatic cases of harm. The first paradigm
involves an injunction situation, in which one claimant with one set of inter-
ests wishes to obtain an injunction requiring the defendant to do X, while the
interests of another claimant-who, as a nonparty, cannot be bound to the
judgment in the first case-wishes to obtain an injunction requiring the de-
fendant to do Y. The interests of other claimants might lead them to seek an
injunction requiring Z. If X, Y, and Z are inconsistent with each other, so that
it is very costly or even impossible for the defendant to meet all three obliga-
tions simultaneously, and if the plaintiffs are numerous enough, class
treatment seems appropriate."
8
The second paradigm involves an interpleader-like situation with
numerous claimants. Assume that 100 people claim an interest in a res that
the defendant is holding, and that each has a legal claim superior to that of
the defendant. If individual actions are filed, the first plaintiff to judgment
will obtain a judgment that the res belongs to him. The second-filing plain-
tiff is not bound by that judgment, and thus is free to obtain a judgment that
the defendant owes her the res (or, more accurately, because the defendant
gave the res to the first plaintiff, the defendant owes monetary equivalent of
the res due to the defendant's "conversion" of the res). And the same is true
for the third plaintiff, and the fourth, right on to the hundredth.
In neither of these paradigms does it necessarily appear to be in the
interests of the egoist plaintiff to seek class certification; the problems the
defendant has in meeting other plaintiffs' demands are not her business, as
long as the defendant can give her the remedy she wants. There are,
however, a number of situations in which the egoist plaintiff will seek
certification. These situations largely parallel those described above' 19:
116. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(A); cf 28 U.S.C. § 1335 (2000) (statutory interpleader); FED. R.
Civ. P. 19(a)(1)(B)(ii) (mandatory joinder when the defendant is "subject to a substantial risk of
incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations"); FED. R. Civ. P. 22 (rule
interpleader).
117. FED. R. CIv. P. 23(b)(2).
118. Of course, this situation is nothing more than the flip side of the injunctive situation
involving the (b)(1)(B) and (b)(2) class actions described supra in subpart II(A). There, the first to
obtain an injunction was in practical effect able to prevent later plaintiffs from obtaining an
injunction that suited their needs; the absent plaintiffs were therefore the harmed parties. In this
context, the later plaintiffs are not so prevented; thus, the harmed party is the defendant, who must
comply with conflicting requirements. One factor determining whether the former or the latter
harm is pertinent is likely to be the viability of independent suits. If enough is at stake that multiple
claimants have an incentive to sue, then the latter harm is more likely to occur. Another
determinant is temporal dispersion. If the claims of some litigants have not yet ripened when the
early claims mature, the former harm is more likely to occur.
119. See supra notes 104-07 and accompanying text.
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* Scenario One: Later-filed suits seeking injunction Yor injunction Z
threaten the ability of the defendant to provide the first plaintiff with
the injunction Xthat she seeks, or threaten to undo the injunction.
0 Scenario Two: A class action increases the chances of winning or
spreads the class representative's cost of litigation across the class (or
both), and these expected advantages outweigh any loss in the quality
of the remedy that the plaintiff would have achieved in individual liti-
gation.
0 Scenario Three: By taking control of the entire litigation, the self-
interested plaintiff steers the case toward her preferred relief. For
instance, the plaintiff might believe her claim to injunction X (or to the
res) is better than that of other potential plaintiffs. A class action un-
der (b)(1)(A) or (b)(2) becomes a way to spread the costs of litigation
among class members, as well as a way to obtain a clear entitlement to
injunction Xor to secure clear title to the res that the competing claims
of other class members might undo.
* Scenario Four: The only way to attract a lawyer who will increase
the chances of victory is to dangle the lure of the recovery of class-
action fees; the increased chances of recovery exceed any potential
loss in the quality of an individual remedy.
a Scenario Five: Tantalized by the promise of larger class fees, class
counsel misleads the putative class representative into believing that
class treatment will lead (on balance) to a better remedy, even if it will
not.
In addition, another scenario is possible in the (b)(1)(A) and (b)(2)
situations: A self-interested defendant could seek or consent to class certifi-
cation to avoid the risk of multiple or inconsistent liability.'
20
As with the (b)(1)(B) and (b)(2) classes, the class now contains
members that have competing interests. Indeed, by definition, the members
of the class wish to subject the defendant to "inconsistent or varying" law-
suits and "incompatible" remedies. Some of the class members have an
interest in achieving one remedy, and others in achieving another remedy.
Although in limited circumstances constituting separate classes according to
group interests might provide an escape from the conundrum of conflicting
120. Although requests by defendants to certify class actions against them are in theory
possible, see Rossetto v. Pabst Brewing Co., 71 F. Supp. 2d 913, 917 (E.D. Wis. 1999), rev'd on
other grounds, 217 F.3d 539 (7th Cir. 2000), they are as rare as hens' teeth. More typically, the
defendant is likely to negotiate a settlement with a putative class representative and class counsel,
and then support the plaintiffs' request for class certification. See, e.g., Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp.,
527 U.S. 815, 822-26 (1999) (noting a defendant's attempt to reach a "global settlement" before
supporting class certification).
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class interests, as a practical matter that solution is unlikely to be effective
for the reasons already explained.'
21
Therefore, the (b)(1)(A) and (b)(2) "harm to defendants" class actions
contain the same constitutional infirmity as the (b)(1)(B) and (b)(2) "harm to
absent class members" class actions. If the Due Process Clause in fact re-
quires an identity of interests among class members, a court cannot certify a
(b)(1)(B) or (b)(2) defendant-harm class action.
C. Conflicts of Interest when a Class Action Is the Superior Aggregation
Mechanism: Rule 23(b)(3) Classes
Unlike the (b)(1) and (b)(2) class actions, the (b)(3) class action is not
designed specifically to prevent harm to absent plaintiffs or to the defendant.
The (b)(3) class action applies principally to monetary claims; plaintiffs with
injunctive claims will use Rules 23(b)(1) and 23(b)(2). 122 The assumption
underlying the (b)(3) class action is that the defendant has sufficient assets to
satisfy putative class members' monetary claims. 123 Unlike a limited-fund or
interpleader-type situation, serial suits by individual plaintiffs will not leave
later-filing plaintiffs without adequate monetary remedies. Nor will a series
of such suits leave the defendant exposed to multiple or inconsistent obliga-
tions within the meaning of Rule 23(b)(1)(A); as courts have long
recognized, inconsistent monetary judgments-some of which order a defen-
dant to pay damages to some plaintiffs and others of which find the
defendant not liable to other plaintiffs for the same behavior--do not consti-
tute a harm to the defendant within the meaning of this rule.'
2 4
Instead, the focus of Rule 23(b)(3) is a more diffuse harm to society as a
whole. Two types of social harm are the central cases. The first is inade-
quate deterrence. The paradigmatic case is "large-scale, small-stakes"
litigation, also known as "negative-value suits." Assume that a credit-card
company has illegally overcharged ten million customers $2 apiece. It is
unlikely that very many, if any, individual cases will be filed; the costs of
litigating each case exceeds the expected recovery (thus giving the suit a
negative net value), and no attorney will work for such a small potential
121. See supra notes 110-14 and accompanying text.
122. In limited circumstances, a court can award monetary relief incidental to an injunctive
claim in a (b)(2) class action. Courts are presently divided over how "incidental" the relief must be,
but under no construction can Rule 23(b)(2) be used when the case is principally about monetary
recovery. Compare Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 415 (5th Cir. 1998) (narrowly
construing the monetary relief available in (b)(2) suits), with Robinson v. Metro-North
Commuter R.R., 267 F.3d 147, 157 (2d Cir. 2001) (rejecting Allison's approach).
123. Cf Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 859-60 (reversing certification of a (b)(l)(B) settlement class action
when the defendant retained some assets, thus making the action unsusceptible to limited-fund
treatment).
124. See In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 506 F. Supp. 762, 789 (E.D.N.Y. 1980)
("Rule 23(b)(1)(A) is not meant to apply ... where the risk of inconsistent results in individual
actions is merely the possibility that the defendants will prevail in some cases and not in others,
thereby paying damages to some claimants and not others.").
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recovery. But this failure to deter the credit-card company has a significant
social cost. By aggregating all ten million cases and by spreading the costs
of litigation across all the claims, the suit becomes economically viable, a
lawyer will now be willing to handle the case in return for a fee based on the
class's recovery, and society achieves a better level of deterrence.
The second central case for the (b)(3) class action involves excessive
litigation costs.125 Here the paradigmatic case is "large-scale, large-stakes"
litigation, in which the expected net recoveries make individual lawsuits eco-
nomically viable. Because the cases tend to arise out of a common pattern of
conduct by the defendant and tend to involve a limited array of injuries, the
same issues are litigated in case after case, courtroom after courtroom. At a
certain point, this repetitive litigation becomes a socially unnecessary
expense.126 A class action that brings together all of the claimants promises
to reduce these costs, as well as the strain on the judiciary, substantially.127
But (b)(3) status is not always in an individual class member's best
interest. The recovery on a class claim can be lower 28 and slower 129 than
recovery on an individual claim. Class treatment can also be unattractive to
125. Opt-out (b)(3) class actions impose certain costs not found in individual litigation, such as
the often pricey cost of giving notice to class members of their right to opt out. See FED. R. Civ. P.
23(c)(2)(B) (delineating the requirements for individual notifications to class members). Therefore,
when I refer to "excessive litigation costs," I mean net excessive costs-the costs that repetitive
individual litigation creates less the costs that (b)(3) litigation imposes.
126. There is an argument that a certain amount of repetitive litigation is socially useful.
According to Professor McGovern's thesis on maturity, large-scale, large-stakes cases often go
through cycles, from the early cycle in which defendants win most cases to a cycle when plaintiffs
respond to the early defense strategies and break through with some significant victories, before
finally reaching a mature equilibrium when the chances of victory can be predicted with some
statistical accuracy. See Francis E. McGovern, An Analysis of Mass Torts for Judges, 73 TEXAS L.
REv. 1821, 1841-43 (1995) (discussing the three phases of mass-tort cases under a maturity theory).
Arguably, the most accurate assessment of the value of cases occurs only after the equilibrium has
been reached. Therefore, before reaching this equilibrium, repetitive litigation is justified as long as
its marginal costs are less than the case's marginal contribution to the establishment of a more
accurate equilibrium. Once an equilibrium is reached, however, the costs of repetitive litigation
cannot be justified.
127. Although it might seem that the reduction of these costs is an advantage to the parties as
well as to society, that is not necessarily the case. For instance, from a defendant's viewpoint, high
litigation costs act as a barrier to entry for some plaintiffs. As long as the defendant's litigation
costs are less than the additional liability costs that the defendant would incur from a lower barrier
to entry, the defendant will prefer to expend money on litigation costs. In particular, a litigation
class action typically threatens a liability judgment far in excess of the savings that the defendant
incurs in lower litigation costs.
128. See Horowitz & Bordens, Aggregation, supra note 25, at 226 (reporting on experimental
results showing that "a plaintiff with a quite strong case ... appears to be better served by being
disaggregated, particularly with reference to punitive damages"). For data on typical recoveries in
class actions, see Thomas E. Willging & Shannon R. Wheatman, Attorney Choice of Forum in
Class Action Litigation: What Difference Does It Make?, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 591, 638-40 &
tbl. 15 (2006), which provides data showing that in state class actions the median recovery was
$850,000 and the median per capita recovery was $350, while in federal class actions the median
recovery was $300,000 and the median per capita recovery was $517.
129. See JAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL., DISCOVERY MANAGEMENT 90 tbl.A-3 (1998) (noting the
positive correlation between time to disposition and class certification).
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counsel: The financial and resource requirements are considerable, pricing
many counsel out of the market; 130 class-action law is a highly specialized
field, beyond the ken or competence of many lawyers; 13' and the lawyer
might lose control of the case to another counsel who ultimately garners the
big fees. 132 In addition, since the mid-1990s, federal courts have been less
hospitable to (b)(3) class actions, especially in the large-scale, large-stakes
context; 33 therefore, class treatment is hardly a given, and might fruitlessly
add cost and delay for claimants and counsel alike.
Nonetheless, without a strong, independently viable claim, a self-
interested claimant is likely to consider class certification for one or more of
the reasons that typically motivate self-interested claimants to seek class
certification: spreading litigation costs, increasing the probability of
recovery, obtaining a litigation premium, or luring a more effective lawyer
through the promise of a large class fee. 134 The opportunity to secure a large
fee is also likely to be attractive to a self-interested lawyer, and might tempt
the lawyer to advise a client to seek class certification even if it is not in the
client's interest to do so. The calculation of self-interested class representa-
tives and class counsel is slightly different in (b)(3) cases than in mandatory
(b)(1) and (b)(2) cases: On one hand, the likely remedy-a fund of money-
often makes class treatment a more lucrative prospect for class counsel; on
the other hand, the expense of giving notice of class members' right to opt
out, and the consequent chance that opt-outs will decrease the value of the
class's claim and increase the chance of competing class actions that might
cost the class representative and class counsel control of the case, create risks
for the representative and counsel.
130. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(g)(1)(A)(iv) (making "the resources that counsel will commit to
representing the class" an issue in determining the adequacy of class counsel).
131. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g)(1)(A)(ii) (making "counsel's experience in handling class
actions [and] other complex litigation" an issue in determining the adequacy of class counsel).
132. Indeed, for a while, a number of courts auctioned off the position of class counsel to the
lowest responsible bidder; the counsel that brought the case initially received no preferential
treatment in class-counsel selection. See, e.g., In re Oracle Sec. Litig., 132 F.R.D. 538, 539 (N.D.
Cal. 1990) (justifying the selection of class counsel via competitive bidding by asserting that the
bidding process allows assessment of the "reasonableness of the fee application by reference to
other applications"). In addition, in suits under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
(PSLRA) of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (2000)), the
court designates the lead plaintiff, who might not be the plaintiff that initially filed the action. The
lead plaintiff then chooses the class counsel, who might not be the counsel that the original plaintiff
chose. See In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201, 222-25 (3d Cir. 2001) (rejecting the auction
theory in PSLRA cases and placing the lead plaintiff in charge of selecting class counsel).
133. See, e.g., Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 622 (1997) (holding that a class
in an asbestos case failed to meet the predominance requirement of Rule 23(b)(3)); Castano v. Am.
Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 744-46 (5th Cir. 1996) (overturning class certification because the class
failed to meet both the predominance and superiority requirements of Rule 23(b)(3)); In re Rhone-
Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1304 (7th Cir. 1995) (granting a writ of mandamus and ordering
decertification of a class of mass-tort claimants).
134. See supra notes 104-07, 119 and accompanying text.
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When self-interested class representatives and self-interested class
counsel seek class status, however, their interests are not the interests that
society hopes to vindicate through the (b)(3) class action.135 The class repre-
sentative seeks to maximize the value of the claim, and class counsel seeks to
maximize the value of the fee. 136 Neither the representative nor the counsel
has the goal of achieving optimal deterrence or reducing litigation costs as
such.
According to Hansberry, however, the critical issue is whether the
interests of class representatives align with the interests of others in the class;
their alignment with society's interests is not the relevant issue. Once again,
however, the structure of the (b)(3) class action creates conflicts within the
class.
The conflict is evident from the language of Rule 23(b)(3). A court can
certify a (b)(3) class action only when "questions of law or fact common to
class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual
members" and "a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly
and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.' ' 137 The predominance require-
ment concedes the existence of noncommon, nonpredominant issues in (b)(3)
class actions.' 38  An obvious problem is the self-interested class
representative's incentive to litigate and prove noncommon issues beyond the
point at which those proofs aid her own case. 139 Indeed, spending even one
dime litigating the noncommon issues of class members eats into the net re-
covery that the class representative can expect.' 40  The problem typically
135. This fact is hardly surprising. For an economic analysis of the inefficiencies that can arise
when parties use the public good of adjudication to achieve private gain, see STEVEN SHAVELL,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 265-70 (1987).
136. Maximizing the value of the fee is not the same as maximizing the value of the class's
claim. POSNER, supra note 28, § 21.11, at 614-16. The literature often analyzes the incentives for
class counsel to depart from the interests of the class as a type of "agency cost." See John C.
Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation: Balancing Fairness and Efficiency in the
Large Class Action, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 883 (1987) (denominating the conflicts of interest
between attorneys and clients that can arise in class-action litigation as an "agency cost" problem);
Jonathon R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs' Attorney's Role in Class Action and
Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Change, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1,
22-27 (1991) (arguing that the lack of monitoring of attorneys by class members and the inefficacy
of bonding in class actions create deviations of interests between attorneys and clients). For a case
illustrating how the fee structure chosen by counsel was not as advantageous to the class as other
structures might have been, see Cendant, 264 F.3d at 285.
137. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). The rule also provides four specific criteria-the interest of class
members in controlling their own cases, the extent of preexisting litigation, the wisdom of
centralizing the litigation in one forum, and the manageability of the class action-that help a court
to flesh out the "predominance" and "superiority" criteria. FED. R. CWv. P. 23(b)(3)(A)-(D).
138. For the exception to this statement, see infra notes 152-58 and accompanying text.
139. Indeed, even on common issues, the interests of the class representative and class members
might not line up perfectly. Given the class representative's particular factual position, pressing
certain claims or theories of liability might enhance her claim, while pressing other claims or
theories might better benefit class members that occupy somewhat different litigation postures.
140. We would expect to find that, when it becomes too costly for them to prove a class
member's claim, the class representative and class counsel will abandon the claim. The
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becomes more acute as the case moves from questions of general liability to
the questions specific to each plaintiff (such as individual causation,
damages, and case-specific defenses) that usually inhabit (b)(3) class actions.
This lack of enthusiasm for proving the noncommon issues of class members
is somewhat counterbalanced by the interests of class counsel, who has an
incentive to maximize the fee and therefore, within limits, to enhance the
value of class members' claims. But that fact merely highlights a conflict of
interest that pertains between the class representative and class counsel.
Moreover, class counsel has an incentive to litigate noncommon issues only
to the extent that doing so maximizes the fee-in other words, to expend
time and money on increasing the size of the monetary recovery only to the
point that an additional unit of time and money earns a greater fee than coun-
sel can earn for other legal work. This point is not necessarily the point at
which the recovery for either the class representative or the class members is
at its maximum. 14' Thus, counsel's interest does not always align tightly
with the interests of either the class representative or the class members.
The misalignment of interests between the class and its counsel extends
beyond the question of fees. One of the enduring realities of most (b)(3)
class actions is that class counsel advances the funds for the litigation
(including the often considerable money required to give notice)., 42 Losing a
class action can visit financial ruin on class counsel. The combination of
fronted costs and expected attorneys fees typically makes class counsel the
largest stakeholder in the class action. In a large-scale, small-stakes case, the
counsel's stake can exceed that of any plaintiff by five or even six orders of
magnitude. Even in large-scale, large-stakes cases, the disparity can be
enormous. For instance, in the Blood Factor settlement class action, 43 class
development of cy pres and other doctrines for providing substituted remedies bears out the
expected result. See In re Airline Ticket Comm'n Antitrust Litig., 307 F.3d 679, 689 (8th Cir.
2002) (approving cy pres distribution of unclaimed settlement proceeds, but modifying the
distribution plan); Democratic Cent. Comm. v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Comm'n, 84 F.3d 451,
454-56 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (describing cy pres and other approaches to distribution of funds when it
was too costly to determine the victims of excessive transit charges); cf Molski v. Gleich, 318 F.3d
937, 953-56 (9th Cir. 2003) (rejecting the settlement in a mandatory class action, and also rejecting
the finding that the class representative and class counsel provided adequate representation, where
the representative received $5,000, counsel received $50,000, class members received nothing, and
the defendant instead made contributions to third-party advocacy groups). This cost-benefit
calculus is not the deontological identity-of-interest analysis that Hansberry and Amchem appear to
demand.
141. See supra note 610 and accompanying text; supra text accompanying notes 107 and 119.
142. Class counsel commonly advances the costs of class-action litigation. See 5 ALBA CONTE
& HERBERT B. NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 15:21, at 78 (4th ed. 2002) (stating that
cost advancements on a contingency basis are critical in class actions); supra note 106 and
accompanying text.
143. This case, In re Factor VIII or IX Concentrate Blood Products Litigation (Blood Factor),
159 F.3d 1016 (7th Cir. 1998), was a class action for settlement brought by one class representative,
Susan Walker, on behalf of all hemophiliacs infected with HIV that had used the defendant's
products, as well as their infected spouses and children, their estates, and all persons with derivative
claims such as loss of consortium and emotional distress. See DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., CLASS
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counsel received $40 million for fees and reimbursement of costs, while each
of the 6,500 class members received $100,000.144 And counsel must deal
with competitive pressures from overlapping class actions brought by other
lawyers who pose a constant risk of settling the case out from underneath
class counsel, thus leaving counsel holding the bag of uncompensated costs
and time. 145 Therefore, the risk tolerance of the class counsel is often differ-
ent from that of the class representative and class members. In such a
circumstance, it is understandable-even if not ethically laudable-when
class counsel acts to protect that investment in the case rather than undertak-
ing riskier strategies that match up better with the risk positions of the
class. 1
46
The superiority inquiry adds to the tension within the class. Superiority
examines the issue of class certification from the viewpoint of society, en-
suring that a class action is a better vehicle for resolving a case than other
possible methods, such as individual litigation, consolidation,
47
multidistricting, 148 and so on.149 It is likely that some class members would
have been better served by one of these alternate methods. But none of those
methods better serves the interests of the class representative or class
counsel; if they did, the representative or counsel would have employed them
to begin with.
The opt-out feature of (b)(3) class actions arguably softens these
conflicting interests. It could be argued that class members waive any
possible conflicts of interest by failing to opt out when afforded the
ACTION DILEMMAS: PURSUING PUBLIC GOALS FOR PRIVATE GAIN 305 (2000) (describing the class
of plaintiffs); id at 315 n.59 (noting that Susan Walker is a fictitious name used to protect the
privacy of the actual class representative).
144. Blood Factor, 159 F.3d at 1018; HENSLER ET AL., supra note 143, at 305-07.
145. There are cases in which defendants arguably pitted counsel in two overlapping class
actions against each other in a reverse auction to drive down the settlement's price. See Reynolds v.
Beneficial Nat'l Bank, 288 F.3d 277, 282-83 (7th Cir. 2002) (remanding the case to determine if a
reverse auction occurred); Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 126 F.3d 1235, 1250 (9th Cir. 1997) (withholding
full faith and credit from a related state-court settlement because the conflicts of interest between
class counsel in state-court action and plaintiff class amounted to inadequate representation),
withdrawn on reh g, 179 F.3d 641, 650 (9th Cir. 1999).
146. Although I do not explore them here, these pressures are also a reality in (b)(1) and (b)(2)
class actions. Because those classes are less common, and they rarely involve monetary awards
akin in size to (b)(3) awards, the degree of conflict between the interests of the class and the
interests of counsel is often less. Cf John C. Coffee, Jr., Conflicts, Consent, and Allocation After
Amchem Products-Or, Why Attorneys Still Need Consent to Give Away Their Clients' Money, 84
VA. L. REV. 1541, 1542, 1544-50 (1998) (demonstrating that serious conflicts of interest exist at the
stage of allocating money among class members).
147. See FED. R. CIV. P. 42(a).
148. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2000).
149. For a full discussion of potential aggregation methods, see generally JAY TIDMARSH &
ROGER H. TRANGSRUD, COMPLEX LITIGATION: PROBLEMS IN ADVANCED CIVIL PROCEDURE 10-
200 (2002).
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opportunity to do so. 5 0 But this argument proves too much, for it wipes out
the doctrine of adequate representation in (b)(3) class actions. It puts those
who do not opt out at the mercy of self-interested class representatives and
class counsel, creating an incentive for rational class members to opt out and
frustrating the hoped-for gains from class treatment. Indeed, treating a fail-
ure to opt out as a waiver turns the idea of adequate representation on its
head; Rule 23's promised trade-off for giving up the right to bring an indi-
vidual action is adequate representation-not the absence of adequate
representation. 
15 1
It is possible to specify one (albeit uncommon) condition in which a
class representative lacks a conflict of interest with class members. The
situation occurs when a class of claimants have a joint entitlement to receive
a lump-sum award, and the proper distribution of the award among the bene-
ficiaries is not in dispute. 152  Further assuming that any variations in the
factual positions of the claimants create no varying legal positions or
theories, 153 there are no noncommon issues. This hypothetical situation is the
monetary equivalent of the "injunction X' or "no injunction" situation de-
scribed in connection with (b)(1)(B) and (b)(2) class actions. 154  But the
(b)(3) class action does not present a comparable free-rider conflict between
the class representative and the class members. The reason is that the (b)(3)
class action generates the fund of money from which expenses will be paid;
had the class representative brought an individual action, the common fund
would have been charged for these expenses in any event. 155  Unless the
150. Hansberry v. Lee, which created the constitutional requirement of adequate representation,
did not involve an opt-out class action. 311 U.S. 32, 39-44 (1940).
151. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 810 (1985) ("Unlike a defendant in a
normal civil suit, an absent class-action plaintiff is not required to do anything. He may sit back and
allow the litigation to run its course, content in knowing that there are safeguards provided for his
protection."). In addition, the waiver argument fails to account for the possibility that, even if
representation is adequate at the time that the opt-out right is provided, subsequent events could
render the class representation inadequate. See id. at 812 ("[T]he Due Process Clause of course
requires that the named plaintiff at all times adequately represent the interests of the absent class
members."); cf FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(4) (permitting, but not requiring, a court to give a second opt-
out right at the time of settlement).
152. For instance, the claimants might be the numerous beneficiaries of a trust or the members
of a corporation or unincorporated association suing on behalf of the trust, corporation, or
association because of an action that injured the trust or corporation, not just the interests of some
beneficiaries of shareholders. Cf FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1-23.2 (derivative actions and actions by
unincorporated associations).
153. For example, in a case brought by shareholders against a corporation, the actions of the
officers or the board of directors might be called into question; if the officers or board also own
shares, the class's conflicting positions take this situation outside of the narrow exception that I am
describing.
154. See supra notes 108-09 and accompanying text.
155. See Bloomer v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 445 U.S. 74, 88 n.15 (1980) (acknowledging "the
established power of a court of equity to charge beneficiaries with a proportionate share of the costs
of creating a common fund through litigation").
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additional costs occasioned by class treatment 156 exceed the expected benefits
(including the greater likelihood of recovery) of class treatment for a par-
ticular class member, 157 no free-rider problem exists.
Cases of this description are rare, and it would be even rarer for a
claimant or counsel to choose to incur the expense and uncertainty associated
with seeking class treatment when the claimant can sue for, and recover, the
same award without encountering such difficulties. 158 Because this example
contains an important insight into the conundrum of adequate representation,
I return to it later.' 59 For now, however, the bottom line is that (b)(3) class
actions also pit the interests of class representatives, class counsel, and class
members against each other-not rarely, but nearly all the time.
D. Summary
The point of this Part has been to demonstrate that a deontological,
identity-of-interests, rising-tides interpretation of adequate representation-
the interpretation seemingly offered by Hansberry and adopted by
Amchem-is unworkable. The circumstances that Rule 23 has identified as
eligible for class treatment almost invariably create divisive interests among
class representatives, class counsel, and class members. Self-interested class
representatives can exploit these conflicts to their advantage and to the dis-
advantage of some class members; self-interested class counsel can exploit
these conflicts to counsel's advantage and to the disadvantage of some class
representatives, some class members, or both. We can try to minimize the
force of this conclusion by arguing that conflicts are permissible as long as
they are "not too bad"-by which we might mean that conflicts can be ig-
nored either when the harm they cause is small (i.e., smaller than the gains
from class treatment) 16 or when the evidence suggests that the better angels
of the representative's and counsel's natures have risen above abject self-
interest. The former argument is impermissible from the conflict-of-interests
perspective suggested in Amchem, for it grounds adequate representation on
156. See supra note 105.
157. Such a case can exist: If the costs of class litigation are spread equally among all class
members, a class member with a very small proportional share of recovery might find that the costs
of litigation are greater than the recovery. Cf Kamilewicz v. Bank of Boston Corp., 92 F.3d 506,
508 (7th Cir. 1996) (describing a class action suit in which an individual plaintiff paid attorneys fees
in an amount forty times greater than his recovery on the merits). This case is discussed infra at
notes 162-65 and accompanying text.
158. The evident circumstances in which class certification might nonetheless be sought are
when class treatment is perceived to increase the likelihood of recovery for the claimant or counsel,
see supra notes 57-58, 60 and accompanying text, or when a claimant that remains ultimately liable
under a jurisdiction's ethical rules for the payment of litigation expenses wishes to limit her liability
for those expenses, see supra note 106 and accompanying text.
159. See infra note 166 and accompanying text.
160. See Reynolds v. Beneficial Nat'l Bank, 288 F.3d 277, 282 (7th Cir. 2002) (noting a
conflict within a class but declining "to regard this particular defect as fatal" due to the costliness of
remedying it through proper subclassing).
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the "greatest good for the greatest number" footing that Amchem
eschewed.' 6' The latter argument assumes that class representatives and
counsel are virtuous, principled, altruistic, or other-regarding to some
degree--or at least that the threat of decertification can make them so. On
this view, Rule 23 is written to set temptation in the path of class representa-
tives and class counsel, and then it measures their worth by how well they
resist. Such a rule is, to say the least, passing strange. Nor is it entirely con-
sistent with Hansberry and Amchem, both of which proceeded from the
premise that when a facial conflict of interest existed, representation was
inadequate; in neither case did the Court ask whether, on the facts, the class
representatives and class counsel had successfully resisted the temptation to
self-deal. Finally, replacing a "no conflict of interest" rule with a "no self-
dealing in fact" rule begs the question of how we determine when self-
dealing is going on, and puts great pressure on court's ability to detect self-
dealing.
As a constitutional requirement, adequate representation is not a
doctrine we can discard because it is inconvenient. If class actions cannot
guarantee adequate representation, it is the law of class actions-not the
doctrine of adequate representation-that must give way. Hence the central
conundrum of class actions: Can we give meaning to the doctrine of adequate
representation without rendering the modem American class action
unconstitutional?
III. Reconstituting Adequacy of Representation
This Part proposes and defends a test for determining adequate
representation that navigates between the reality of internal class conflict and
the benefits of class actions. In short, "adequate representation" with respect
to a class member exists when the actions of the class representative and
class counsel place that class member in no worse a position than the class
member would have occupied by retaining individual control of her
litigation. I begin by describing and justifying this principle. I then defend
the proposal against its principal objections and show its superiority to other
possible solutions.
A. Adequacy of Representation: Not Harming Class Members' Net
Expectations
The definition of adequate representation that best accommodates the
preference for individual control of litigation, the need for class actions, and
161. After identifying a series of potential conflicts within the class-between those with
present claims and those with future claims; between those entitled to opt out and those not entitled
to opt out; and between those asked to sacrifice their claims for consortium and those not asked to
sacrifice their claims of asbestos exposure-Amchem did not then ask how "small" these conflicts
were in relation to the benefits of the class settlement. See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521
U.S. 591, 627 (1997).
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the conflicting interests within the class is simple: The representation
provided to a class member is adequate if and only if the actions of the class
representative and class counsel can reasonably be expected to place that
class member in no worse a position than that class member would have en-
joyed had she retained control of her own case. More simply, the principle
might be stated: Do no harm.
So stated, the principle seems self-evident. Representation that leaves
some class members worse off than they would have been without class cer-
tification must be inadequate, right? Surprisingly, the answer has not always
been "yes." The poster-child counterexample occurred in Kamilewicz v.
Bank of Boston Corp.,' 62 in which a state-court, negative-value class settle-
ment resulted in a $2.19 recovery and a $91.33 assessment of attorneys fees
for some class members-thus leaving these class members owing $89 as a
result of their lawsuit. 163 The federal court refused to reexamine the state
court's decision upholding the reasonableness of the settlement.' 64
Admittedly, cases with Kamilewicz's egregious facts are rare; 165 typically, a
successful class action garners a positive recovery for class members. But
that fact does not mean that the representation was adequate in the sense that
I describe; adequacy does not hinge on a positive result in absolute terms, but
rather a positive result in comparative terms, so that the net result from class
treatment equals or exceeds the net result from a class member's retention of
control over her own case. It is not difficult to imagine circumstances in
which a class action might result in a positive result for class members but
still fail the adequacy-of-representation test that I propose.
At the same time, the requirement is fairly minimal-a modest and
elementary principle of justice rather than an extraordinary and heroic
burden. 166 It is easy to comprehend and, in most circumstances, easy to ap-
ply. Indeed, it is possible to state the condition of adequate in mathematical
form. Let PI represent that probability of a class member's recovery in
162. 92 F.3d 506 (7th Cir. 1996).
163. The total amount awarded for attorneys fees was in dispute, but lay somewhere between
$8.5 million and $14 million. 1d. at 508.
164. The underlying state-court class action involved an alleged overcharge in a mortgage
escrow account. Kamilewicz, 92 F.3d at 508. The plaintiffs claimed in their federal suit that class
counsel and the defendants in the state-court class action had colluded in the settlement, thus
violating federal racketeering laws and their civil rights, and further committing fraud, conversion,
and malpractice. Id. at 509. The district court dismissed the suit on the basis of the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine, which holds that federal courts cannot act as appellate courts over the decisions
of state courts. Id. at 509-12. The Supreme Court denied certiorari. Kamilewicz v. Bank of
Boston Corp., 520 U.S. 1204 (1997). For a scathing critique of the decision, see Susan P. Koniak,
How Like a Winter? The Plight of Absent Class Members Denied Adequate Representation, 79
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1787, 1808-17 (2004).
165. But see Koniak, supra note 164, at 1797 (suggesting that class-action litigation is rife with
abuse).
166. Indeed, the "do no harm" principle is a generalized statement of the reason that no conflict
of interest exists in the Rule 23(b)(3) class action that I described supra at notes 152-58 and
accompanying text.
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individual litigation, LI the size of the recovery in individual litigation, F, the
attorneys fees in individual litigation, and C, the costs of individual litigation.
And let Pc represent that probability of a class member's recovery in class
litigation, Lc the size of the recovery in class litigation, Fc the member's pro
rata share of attorneys fees in class litigation, and Cc the member's pro rata
share of costs in class litigation. Adequate representation exists when:
(PI x LI) - (F1 + C) < (Pc x Lc) - (Fc + Cc),
where 0 < (Pc x Lc) - (Fc + Cc).
1. Explaining the Operation of the Principle.-This formulation allows
me to explore a number of the central features of this adequate-representation
principle. First, as the P x L term reflects, adequacy of representation de-
pends on expected recoveries; it is determined before the fact, not based on
how the case actually turns out. 16 7 Second, as the F + C term reflects, ade-
quacy of representation depends on net, rather than gross, recovery.
Individual litigation can lead to an award (L,) that is higher than a class
award (Lc).168 Compared to individual litigation, however, a class action can
increase P and decrease F + C, which together raise the net expectancy de-
spite the lower award. 169 In effect, therefore, the "do no harm" principle
requires the class representative and class counsel to spread the gains antici-
pated from a rising P and a falling F + C (net of losses anticipated by a
falling L) among class members, so none are disadvantaged by class treat-
ment.
Third, the lower limit of the formula (0 <5 (Pc x Lc) - (Fc + Cc)) is
necessary to account for negative-value suits like Kamilewicz, which would
normally not be brought as independent litigation. Without the lower limit, a
self-interested class representative or class counsel can engage in a signifi-
cant amount of self-dealing in such cases. To take Kamilewicz as an
example,170 assume that in order to recover the class members' $2.19 in
overcharges, an individual suit would have cost $2,000. With an expected
recovery of -$1,997.83, the class members almost surely will not bring the
suit; thus, the effective value of their suit is $0. If -$1997.83 rather than $0
is the number that constrains a self-interested class representative or class
counsel, then the actions of the class counsel in Kamilewicz could have wors-
ened the financial position of the Kamilewiczes by as much as $1,997
without being regarded as inadequate-a far more unjust result than the $89
injustice that occurred. Placing the lower limit of zero on the adequacy
167. Thus, a class member cannot claim the representation was inadequate merely because the
class lost the case, while the class member would have won an individual case.
168. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
169. For an illustration of this statement, see supra notes 104-06 and accompanying text.
170. See supra notes 162-64 and accompanying text.
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principle reflects the reality that many large-scale, small-stakes claims are
not independently viable.
Fourth, the calculation of adequacy must be done for each class
member. It is not enough that, overall, the benefits of class treatment exceed
the benefits of individual control; that issue has already been determined by
other provisions in Rule 23(a).171 Rather, the Due Process Clause guarantees
each and every class member adequate representation. This demand can be
tricky when class members have a variety of types of claims, types of
injuries, and strength of claims, and also have temporal variations. To take
the hypothetical example previously discussed, assume a $1 million limited
fund with 100 potential claimants, each of whom has an equal and identical
$20,000 claim. 172 Assume as well that the claims of thirty of the claimants
have already matured, and those of the other seventy will mature in several
years. Individual actions by the present thirty claimants will deplete the bulk
of the fund ($600,000, or $20,000 apiece for each claimant), and leave the
remaining seventy claimants to recover a fractional share ($5,714 apiece) of
their claims in their individual suits. Self-interested class counsel might wish
to bring this case as a (b)(1)(B) class action in order to obtain fees based on
recovery of the full $1 million fund. If the class action is successful, class
counsel might well contend for a simple (and equitable) distribution of
$10,000 to each class member, less costs and fees. If so, it is unlikely that
class counsel has adequately represented the thirty present claimants, even
though counsel has adequately represented the seventy future claimants and
even though, from a social viewpoint, the settlement causes no overall harm
(the windfall to the seventy offsets the losses to the thirty, and the per capita
cost of implementing the remedy is likely less as well). 173 The only circum-
stance in which representation of the thirty class members would be adequate
is when the costs of individual litigation (FI + C1) are so high that the net in-
dividual recovery for the thirty claimants is greater than the net recovery
under an equal-share class settlement. 174
171. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
172. See supra text accompanying note 103.
173. This example shows a limitation of the "do no harm" principle: its potential to achieve less
efficiency than other possible solutions. I consider this criticism infra in subpart II(B)(3). For a
case on which this example is loosely based, see Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 857-59
(1999), in which the court rejected certification of a (b)(l)(B) class in part because the settlement
treated claimants equally even though class members whose claims accrued before 1959 had
stronger claims than class members whose claims accrued after 1959.
174. For instance, if we assumed that a present claimant's fees and costs for recovering $20,000
were $10,000, and the likelihood of recovery were 70%, then the net expected recovery for the
thirty claimants in individual litigation would be $4,000 (0.7 x $20,000 - $10,000). On the other
hand, if we assumed that the total fees and costs in the class action were $500,000 (or $5,000 per
class member), then a settlement that proposed an equal division of the fund ($10,000 apiece) would
lead to a net recovery of $5,000 (1 x $10,000 - $5,000) for the thirty present class members, and the
class counsel's representation in agreeing to an equal settlement would be adequate.
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Fifth, adequate representation is not perfect representation. The "do no
harm" principle does not require the class representative and class counsel to
maximize each class member's individual recovery. It requires only that the
class representative and class counsel do no worse for each class member
than the class member would have done individually. Thus, a range of ac-
tions are likely to be deemed adequate; the class representative and class
counsel need not select the action that best advances the interests of each
class member. Indeed, in light of nearly inevitable tensions within the
class, 175 it is unlikely that they could consistently select actions that did so.
They need not be worried that their litigation decisions will be deemed in-
adequate merely because, after the fact, it turns out that those actions did not
realize the greatest possible gain for a particular class member. The "do no
harm" principle is designed as a check on self-interested behavior, not as a
principle that chooses actions based on the greatest good of a class member
or even of the class as a whole.
Sixth, and conversely, the formulation is a floor, not a ceiling. Nothing
prevents a class representative or class counsel motivated by notions of fair-
ness or justice from trying to make class members better off than they would
have been in individual litigation.
76
Seventh, the "do no harm" principle allows-indeed, expects-constant
recalculation of adequate representation as a class action proceeds. The ac-
tions of the class representative and class counsel are constantly altering P, L,
F, and C. Thus, at the outset of a case, the actions of the class representative
and class counsel might appear likely to better the lot of all class members.
Once settlement negotiations begin, however, the class representative or class
counsel might be tempted to agree to terms that sell out the interests of some
class members. Upon settlement, adequacy must be recalculated to compare
the value of each class member's recovery under the settlement to the recov-
ery that could have been expected through individual litigation.
Eighth, the principle controls collusive behavior. Any principle of
adequacy that asks only whether there is an identity of interests among class
members does not prevent one identically situated class member from turn-
ing on another, or the class counsel from turning on the class as a whole.
Any principle of adequacy that looks only to overall class benefits runs the
risk that the class representative or class counsel will, with the tacit coopera-
tion of the defendant, capture most of those benefits for herself. The "do no
harm" principle assures that, whatever side deals or wink-and-nod agree-
ments might occur in class actions, class members are not made worse by
them.
175. See supra subparts II(A)-(C).
176. Indeed, in many situations, institutional structures are likely to require, or at least push,
class representatives and class counsel toward a more equitable treatment of class members than the
one that the "do no harm" principle requires as its minimum. See infra notes 235-39 and
accompanying text.
20091 1179
Texas Law Review
Ninth, and significantly, the "do no harm" formulation makes no
distinction between the actions of the class representative and the actions of
class counsel. As I have described, conflicts can arise due to the actions of
either.177 This formulation looks at the results, not the sources, of action.
Thus, it becomes unnecessary to specify separate duties or obligations for
class representatives and class counsel.1
78
Tenth, and finally, although this formulation is designed to deal with the
problem of indifference in class representation, 179 it also links up with the
other half of the adequacy-of-representation problem: incompetence. 8 0 One
of the difficulties of an identity-of-interest approach to adequate representa-
tion is its inability to answer the question: How do we measure the
competence of the class representative and class counsel? The "do no harm"
principle provides the answer: Incompetence exists when neither the class
representatives nor class counsel are able to ensure that class members will
end up no worse off than they would have been if they had retained control
of their case. This answer provides a reference point for determining the
financial, experiential, legal, mental, and probity requirements that the
competence doctrine places on class representatives and class counsel.
Indeed, the operation of the principle promises numerous benefits and
solves some of the present predicament involved in the representation of
competing interests. In the following section, I demonstrate that the principle
can also be justified with reference to structural, philosophical, and economic
arguments.
2. Justifying the Principle.-The "do no harm" principle for
determining adequacy of representation is consequentialist; it measures the
adequacy of the actions of class representatives and class counsel solely in
terms of their effects on class members. It evaluates outcomes, not
motivations. Therefore, the principle becomes immediately unappealing to
those who prefer to ground reasons for action, or reasons for procedural
rules, either in virtue or in deontological duty. 18 1 If class representatives and
177. See supra notes 57-60, 107, 121, 134-36 and accompanying text.
178. In this regard, the principle offers a coherent legal ethic for attorneys involved in complex
litigation. See TIDMARSH & TRANGSRUD, supra note 21, at 914 ("Ethical questions lie at the very
heart of complex litigation, and no proposed solution for complex litigation can be deemed adequate
unless the solution works out its ethical implications."); JACK B. WEINSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE
tN MASS TORT LITIGATION 44 (1995) (noting that his experience on the bench demonstrated that the
present ethics rules are predicated on the traditional relationships in two-litigant cases and do not do
enough to provide "realistic guidance to today's lawyers and judges").
179. See supra notes 62, 85 and accompanying text.
180. See supra notes 62, 84-86 and accompanying text.
181. For an examination of various virtue-based, deontological, and consequentialist theories of
procedure, including a strong critique of the consequentialist approach, see Lawrence B. Solum,
Procedural Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 226-32, 242-73 (2004). See generally Robert G.
Bone, The Process of Making Process: Court Rulemaking, Democratic Legitimacy, and Procedural
Efficacy, 87 GEO. L.J. 887, 918-53 (1999) (describing efficiency-based, rights-based, and process-
based theories of procedure).
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class counsel were compelled by a sense of virtue, duty, or altruism to make
the class members better off than individual litigation would, the adequacy
principle that I propose might be unnecessary.' 82 But the principle admits of
no illusions on that score; it is intended to act as a constraint on the self-
interested who wish to achieve the maximum benefit for themselves. As
such, the "do no harm" principle imposes a consequentialist limit on their
actions-a limit that speaks in the same language that they do.
Indeed, both internal arguments 183 and external arguments' 84 support the
principle. To begin with internal arguments, the "do no harm" principle
aligns the doctrine of adequate representation with the other central require-
ments of Rule 23--efficiency and the avoidance of harms-as well as with
the structure of the joinder rules, with the modern understanding of proce-
dural due process, and with the results in Hansberry and Amchem. As I have
described, the foundational requirement for all class actions, which
Rule 23(a) seeks in part to ensure, is the efficiency of the class action in rela-
tion to individual litigation. 185 Likewise, Rule 23(b) specifies certain harms
that class actions must avoid. 186 Both requirements are consequentialist in
orientation; Rules 23(a) and (b)(3) are utilitarian in orientation, while
Rules 23(b)(1) and (b)(2) have more solicitude for preventing harms to indi-
viduals even if they are not necessarily social harms. As we have also seen,
Rule 23 still retains an egoist or self-interested cast in certain regards, espe-
cially in its willingness to place the decision to seek class certification in the
hands of class representatives and class counsel. 87 The "do no harm" princi-
ple mediates among these diverging consequentialist tendencies and
harmonizes them. It leaves room for some self-interested behavior-it does
not require the representative or counsel to seek the best outcome for the
class or for each class member. At the same time, it assures that the class
action will do at least as much good as individual litigation would do, thus
achieving certain social benefits. And it avoids harming absent class
members, which is a concern that manifests itself specifically in
Rule 23(b)(1)(B) and (b)(2). The "do no harm" formula is not the only prin-
182. The principle is a floor on action, not a ceiling.
183. By "internal" arguments, I refer to arguments derived from legal rules, structures, and
precedents. These arguments might also be described as formalist, in the sense that existing legal
rules, structures, and precedents constrain or determine the choice of a proper legal outcome. See
Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509, 511-29 (1988) (defining common uses of the
term "formalism" as, variously, the "denial of choice" or the "limitation of choice"); Emily
Sherwin, A Defense of Analogical Reasoning in Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1179, 1189-93 (1999)
(stating that arguments by analogy help to make law more stable and less error-prone than does
open-ended reasoning).
184. By "external" arguments, I mean arguments grounded in sources other than legal
structures, rules, and precedents.
185. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
186. See supra notes 42-46 and accompanying text.
187. See supra notes 5 17-61 and accompanying text.
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ciple that can mediate among these tendencies, 188 but it sits nicely as a
compromise among them.
For the same reason, the formula is aligned with principles and ideas
that drive joinder law more generally. As I have discussed, the default join-
der rule, Rule 20, allows plaintiffs to engage in egoist joinder behavior-but
it ultimately checks that behavior by considering both the efficiency of a
plaintiffs joinder decision and the fairness of that decision to the
defendant. 8 9 In addition, Rule 19(a)(1)(B)(i) requires joinder of absent
parties when the failure to join such parties "as a practical matter impair[s] or
impede[s] the person's ability to protect the interest."'190 Thus, at the broader
level of joinder, the compromise among egoism, utilitarianism, and altruism
that manifests itself in Rule 23 also finds a place. Therefore, the "do no
harm" principle, which likewise finds middle ground that partially validates
each of these tendencies, fits comfortably within the range of ideas that ani-
mate American joinder decisions.
A third internal argument is the "do no harm" principle's consistency
with the modern approach to due process. Although Hansberry itself was a
bit dodgy about the exact source of the constitutional right to adequate
representation-it located the source of the right in both the Due Process
Clause and the Full Faith and Credit Clause' 91'-the right is cast purely in due
process terms today. 192  The Supreme Court provided the modern test for
determining the constitutionality of deprivations of individualized adversarial
procedure in Mathews v. Eldridge193: departures from adversarial process
must have expected benefits that equal or exceed the costs to an individual
from the loss of traditional adversarial process.194  Therefore, as a type of
188. For instance, I consider another possible principle-a rule that adequacy requires class
representatives and class counsel to improve the positions of class members in relation the second-
best joinder alternative. See infra notes 248-55 and accompanying text.
189. See supra notes 20-23, 36-38 and accompanying text; see also FED. R. Civ. P.
19(a)(1)(B)(ii) (requiring joinder when a plaintiffs joinder decision "leave[s] an existing party
subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations").
190. This language parallels that of Rule 23(b)(l)(B), which shows a similar solicitude for
protecting the rights of absent plaintiffs. The two protections do not conflict; joinder under Rule 19,
however, is subject to the requirements of Rule 23. FED. R. Civ. P. 19(d).
191. See supra note 94.
192. See, e.g., Richards v. Jefferson County, 517 U.S. 793, 805 (1996) (holding that due
process prevents the assertion of the preclusive effect of a prior judgment against a nonparty that
was not adequately represented in the prior case); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797,
812 (1985) (explaining that due process requires "that the named plaintiff at all times adequately
represent the interests of the absent class members").
193. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
194. Id. at 319, 335. The Supreme Court continues to adhere to this formulation. See
Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2268 (2008) (citing to the Mathews v. Eldridge test to
support the "idea that the necessary scope of habeas review in part depends upon the rigor of any
earlier proceedings"); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 509, 529 (2004) (using the Mathews v.
Eldridge test to determine the scope of an enemy combatant's opportunity to contest his detention).
On the economic underpinnings ofMathews v. Eldridge, see POSNER, supra note 28, § 21.1, at 593-
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departure from traditional adversarial theory,1 95 class actions satisfy the
Mathews v. Eldridge formulation of due process as long as the loss to each
class member from not being able to individually litigate her claim does not
exceed the expected benefits of class treatment. One of the problems of the
conflict-of-interest approach for determining adequacy of representation as a
constitutional matter is its poor match-up with the decidedly consequentialist
test of Mathews v. Eldridge; under the conflict-of-interest approach, repre-
sentation can be inadequate even if the conflict costs less than the gains from
class treatment.' 96 On the other hand, the "do no harm" approach matches up
well with the Mathews v. Eldridge formulation for due process: Its insistence
that class members not be made worse by class treatment guarantees that, as
long as the class action reaps social benefits,1 97 Mathews v. Eldridge-style
due process has been satisfied.
198
The final internal argument is the principle's consistency with the
outcomes in both Hansberry and Amchem. In Hansberry, the position staked
out by the class representative in the first class action had the potential to
harm those class members-including future property owners who would
buy the property during the twenty-five year term of the racially restrictive
covenant-who, for economic or social reasons, wished to sell to African-
Americans. On a "do no harm" theory, answering the question of adequate
representation is not as simple as showing the possibility of different litiga-
tion positions among class members. Rather, the issue is whether, at the time
that the first class action was certified, obtaining a judgment finding that the
covenant was valid was expected to put any class member in a worse position
than she would have been in had she been allowed to control her own litiga-
tion. To answer that question, a court would have needed to compare (1) the
expected value-for each present and future homeowner during the remain-
ing duration of the covenant-of the home in a white-only neighborhood,
after subtracting the cost of bringing the first class-action litigation but add-
ing the expected cost of an individual's possible future suit to enforce the
covenant, against (2) the expected value-for each present and future home
owner-of the home without any restrictive covenants. If the latter value
was greater than the former, then the Hansberry class action violated the "do
no harm" principle. On the facts of Hansberry, it appeared that this was the
195. See supra text accompanying note 41.
196. See supra notes 88-97 and accompanying text.
197. The requirements of class certification ensure that these benefits will accrue; class
treatment must be more efficient than individual litigation, see supra note 78 and accompanying
text, and must avoid harms that individual litigation causes, see supra notes 42-48 and
accompanying text.
198. Of course, the Mathews v. Eldridge test could also be satisfied on a lesser showing than
the "do no harm" approach, for it allows individual litigants (or class members) to be made worse
off as long as the social gains from class treatment are great enough. Thus, the "do no harm"
approach is not the constitutional minimum that Mathews v. Eldridge might tolerate.
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case. 199 Therefore, the representation in the first case harmed the interests of
some class members and was inadequate as to them.
Likewise, Amchem is correctly decided on a "do no harm" approach,
even though the Court used a different rationale. Amchem had identified two
principal conflicts within the class: the failure to provide any recovery for
consortium claimants and the failure to protect future claimants by giving
them inflation-adjusted future awards that would have made their claims
equivalent in value, in real-dollar terms, to those of class members with pre-
sent claims.200 On the first issue, the Court was clearly correct, as long as
consortium claims had a positive value in individual litigation; if they did,
then the class representatives who agreed to the dismissal of the claims did
harm to the interests of those class members. Available evidence suggests
that such claims had a positive net value.20' With regard to the present
future conflict that Amchem identified, the "do no harm" approach is a more
complex analysis than the one in which the Court engaged, but its outcome is
the same. With respect to future claimants, the "do no harm" principle would
have required the Court to compare the expected value of each class
member's individual claim (discounted by the possibility that the defendants
would become insolvent and less the cost of individual litigation) to the value
received in the litigation; if any class member stood to gain from individual
treatment, then representation was inadequate as to that member. Given the
values of such claims in relation to the expected payouts in the settlement, it
seems likely that the decision of class representatives in Amchem to settle
caused harm to some class members.20 2 Under the "do no harm" approach,
however, the harm was most likely incurred by present class members; the
value of future class members' claims needed to be discounted by the realis-
tic possibility that the settling defendants might declare bankruptcy or
become insolvent. In addition, the "do no harm" approach reveals another
problem with adequate representation on which the Court did not focus. In
Amchem, class counsel agreed to settle existing individual claims on better
199. At the time that the first class action was litigated, property values in the racially restricted
neighborhood were falling; due to economic and social conditions, African-Americans were the
only willing purchasers-and they were willing to pay a premium to buy the homes in the
neighborhood. Sales conditions continued to deteriorate between the time of the first class action
and the time of the Hansberry litigation, and some home owners were eager and willing to sell to
African-Americans. See Tidmarsh, supra note 66, at 240, 251, 254, 256-57, 262 (describing forces
that caused African-American demand for homes in the Washington Park neighborhood and the sale
of certain homes to African Americans).
200. See supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
201. For an example of pre-Amchem asbestos-exposure litigation involving individual claims
akin to the claims settled in Amchem-a case in which two spouses were awarded $100,000 apiece
for consortium damages-see Carpenter v. GAF Corp., Nos. 90-3460, 90-3461, 1994 WL 47781, at
*1 (6th Cir. Feb. 15, 1994).
202. Compare id. (affirming damages awards in individual asbestos litigation of $498,750 and
$540,000), with TIDMARSH, supra note 97, at 52-53 (noting that the settlement range for most
mesothelioma claims in Amchem was $20,000 to $200,000).
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terms than they settled the claims of class members.2 °3 Assuming that the
amounts of the individual settlements were fair,20 4 a "do no harm" principle
holds that, in failing to obtain comparable settlement amounts for class
members whose claims would mature before the defendants' bankruptcy or
insolvency would presumably drive down the value of future claims, the
Amchem representatives and counsel left those class members worse off than
they would have been in individual litigation, and therefore failed to provide
205them with adequate representation.
The "do no harm" principle also is justified by external arguments.
Philosophically, the principle rests on two premises: individual autonomy
and the view that, as John Rawls put it, people organize into societies as "a
cooperative venture for mutual advantage." 206 The value of autonomy is a
foundational premise in modem Western moral and political philosophy.20 7
Likewise, the classic modem account of society-from Hobbes through
Locke, Rousseau, and Mill to Rawls-is that people give up some of their
autonomy because social cooperation attains something more desirable,
whether that "something" is security, enjoyment of property, the moral basis
for civil liberty, or the prevention of harm to others.208 But that account still
does not determine the precise constraints that society can impose on an
individual's right to act-in other words, the extent to which society can
bend one individual's autonomy to the comparable claims of others to their
203. See Georgine v. Amchem Products, Inc., 157 F.R.D. 246, 298, 305-11 (E.D. Pa. 1994)
(analyzing the degree of the disparity), rev'd on other grounds, 83 F.3d 610 (3d Cir. 1996), aff'd
sub nom. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997); Koniak, supra note 2, at 1064-78.
204. The objectors to the Amchem settlement argued that the amounts of the individual
settlements were too high, thus proving collusion between class counsel and the defendants.
Georgine, 157 F.R.D. at 306. The district court found that the payments to individuals were within
historical settlement ranges and therefore justified. Id. at 307-10.
205. As I have noted, the "do no harm" principle makes no distinction between the ethical
obligations of lawyers and the representational responsibilities of class representatives, nor does it
need to break out collusion as a separate concern. See supra notes 177-78 and accompanying text.
Therefore, even though the district court found neither ethical improprieties nor collusion in the
settlement of the individual claims, Georgine, 157 F.R.D. at 305-11, the "do no harm" principle
nonetheless finds the settlement improper as to those class members whose claims matured before
or soon after the filing of the class complaint. Whether the representation of class members with
claims that matured in the far future was inadequate-the issue on which the Supreme Court
focused in Amchem-is less clear under the "do no harm" approach; the answer requires a
comparison between the settlement value of the claims and the expected value of those claims-
after discounting for the possibility of bankruptcy or other events (such as a congressional bailout of
the asbestos industry) that might diminish their value-in the absence of a settlement.
206. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 4 (rev. ed. 1999).
207. See John Christman, Autonomy in Moral and Political Philosophy, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY, supra note 29, http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fa112003/entries/autonomy-moral.
"Autonomy" is a word with multiple potential meanings. Id. Here I use it in the sense of freedom
from external constraints on achieving an individual's desired goods.
208. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 87-90 (J.M. Dent & Sons Ltd. 1914) (1651); JOHN LOCKE,
SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT § 95 (C.B. Macpherson ed., Hackett Publ'g Co. 1980) (1690);
MILL, supra note 49, at 23; RAWLS, supra note 206, at 4; JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, ON THE
SOCIAL CONTRACT 52-56 (Roger D. Masters ed., Judith R. Masters trans., 1978) (1762).
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autonomy.2°9 For Locke, the natural law imposed necessary limits; 21 for
Kant, the categorical imperative required each individual to treat every indi-
vidual as an end, not a means;2 for Mill, the limiting principle was the
maximization of utility;212 for Rawls, it was the veil of ignorance .213
The "do no harm" principle borrows from this tradition, relying most on
Mill's famous observation that one individual's right to swing a fist ends at
another person's nose,214 on Kant's categorical imperative, and on the
Rawlsian veil of ignorance. In effect, class representatives and class counsel
become the agents placed in charge of the claims of class members; at the
same time, they are also looking after their distinct and independent interests.
The "do no harm" principle insists that in exercising their autonomous right
to advance their own litigation interests, they do not act in a way that harms
the litigation interests of those for whom they serve as agents. It guarantees
that the "society" created by the class representative and class counsel works
together for mutual advantage; the representative and counsel cannot repre-
sent those that the class action places at a disadvantage in relation to their
autonomous right to bring individual litigation. It does not deny the class
representative and class counsel the opportunity to achieve better outcomes
for themselves than they could achieve through individual litigation. Indeed,
the provision of such an opportunity is a necessary incentive to attract repre-
sentatives and counsel to file class actions that, as we have seen, beneficially
prevent certain types of undesirable harm. 2  But in exercising this personal
freedom-this right to swing their arms, if you will-representatives and
counsel must stop when they threaten to hit the "noses" of class members.
By guaranteeing absent class members the same expected (if not better) out-
come as individual litigation would have yielded, class representatives and
class counsel also respect absent class members as their own ends, rather
than simply as a means to achieve the ends of the representative and counsel.
Moreover, according to the Rawlsian veil of ignorance, arrangements
that benefit some more than others can be regarded as just when all those
affected by the arrangement-not knowing whether they will occupy a fa-
vored or unfavored position under the arrangement-will nonetheless
209. See William B. Rubenstein, Divided We Litigate: Addressing Disputes Among Group
Members and Lawyers in Civil Rights Campaigns, 106 YALE L.J. 1623, 1645, 1645-46 (1997)
("The primary problem with the individualist model is the central downside of liberalism generally:
a satisfactory account of its limits.").
210. See LOCKE, supra note 208, § 96 (finding that once individuals choose to become part of a
community, they "submit to the will and determination of the majority," where the majority
"determines.... by the law of nature and reason, the power of the whole").
211. Hans Reiss, Introduction to KANT: POLITICAL WRITINGS, supra note 27, at 1, 18.
212. MILL, supra note49, at 14.
213. RAWLS, supra note 206, at 11.
214. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
215. See supra subpart I(B).
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consent to it.216 Thus, assume that we place the class representative, the class
counsel, and all class members behind a veil of ignorance, so that they do not
know which position they will occupy in a class action. We then ask them to
choose one of three governing principles for the behavior of the class repre-
sentative and class counsel: a principle that permits no conflicts of interest; a
principle that tolerates conflicts of interest and further allows the class repre-
sentative and class counsel to act in a self-interested way that risks harm to
class members; and a principle that tolerates conflicts of interest when no one
is made worse by the conflict and some are made better. The position on
which all (including the risk-averse) should be able to agree is the last-the
"do no harm" principle. 217 Like the "no conflicts" position, no one ends up
worse off from class treatment; like the "allow all conflicts" position, some
are made better off. The "do no harm" principle creates no risk of loss, and
promises the possibility of a gain, from class treatment. It is therefore the
principle on which all, sitting behind the veil of ignorance, can agree on.
What the "do no harm" principle rejects is the "greatest good for the
greatest number" solution of utilitarianism. It is easily possible to construct a
Kamilewicz-type class-action hypothetical in which most class members end
up better off from class as opposed to individual litigation by, say, $5 apiece,
while just a few class members end up worse off by $1 apiece. Under a
"greatest good" measure of adequacy, the representation is fine. Under the
"do no harm" approach, it is not. The "do no harm" approach retains a
greater respect for the individualist model of American adjudication, which
places a premium on each litigant's liberty and autonomy.218 It also forces
those who gain from class treatment to redistribute some of those gains to
others, so they become at least indifferent to the outcome. 219 Even if class-
216. RAWLS, supra note 206, at 118-23.
217. Rational wealth maximizers might prefer the second position in some circumstances.
Assume that the class action contains one million people plus one class counsel. Assume as well
that the expected outcome from individual litigation is a gain of $1, but the expected outcome from
the class action is a loss of 50 cents for every person in the class except for the class counsel, who
will receive a fee of $2 million. Under this scenario, a rational individual sitting behind the veil of
ignorance might support the class action, for there is a one in 1,000,001 chance of obtaining
$2 million (thus an expected gain of roughly $2), and a one million in 1,000,001 chance of being
made worse $1.50 (roughly, an expected loss of $1.50). When we consider risk-averse individuals,
however, the "do no harm" principle becomes the principle on which all, sitting behind a veil of
ignorance, would choose.
218. See Rubenstein, supra note 209, at 1644 ("Current procedural and ethical rules encourage
group members and attorneys to pursue their own individual paths in filing, pursuing, and
constructing test cases."); supra notes 24-28 and accompanying text.
219. Utilitarian theory recognizes the reality that harm must sometimes be visited on a few in
order to achieve the greater good; thus, a switchman can permissibly route a runaway train onto the
track with one worker rather than keep it on the track with five workers. See Judith Jarvis
Thomson, The Trolley Problem, 94 YALE L.J. 1395, 1395 (1985). These hard ethical dilemmas
arise when harm to some is inevitable, and the question is how to keep harm to its bare minimum.
But that problem is different from harming someone when there is no reason to do so. In the
context of class actions, when the class achieves gains that exceed its costs, asking some members
of the class to bear losses, when it is possible to distribute some of the gains achieved by others in
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action status takes away the autonomy of class members to act on their own
litigation interests, it guarantees them the expected benefits of that autonomy.
The distribution of the gains of class treatment among the class mem-
bers can also be explained on economic grounds. The "do no harm"
approach to adequate representation forces class representatives, class
counsel, and class members who benefit from class treatment to internalize
the costs that the class action might otherwise impose on other class
members. Without a mechanism to internalize these costs, class
representatives and class counsel will be too willing to offload the costs of
the class action onto some class members, and to set out on courses of con-
duct that enrich themselves while neglecting the costs of their behavior.
Indeed, "do no harm" adequacy of representation is a specific
application of the principle of Pareto improvement, the economic concept
that holds an action to be more efficient when at least one person is made
better off by the action and no one is made worse off.220 Thus, in comparison
to individual litigation, the "do no harm" principle ensures greater efficiency.
Admittedly, the "do no harm" principle does not go so far as to insist on
Pareto optimality, the economic concept that defines efficiency as the state of
affairs in which no further Pareto improvements can be made. 221  In
neoclassical economics, Pareto optimality is often tempered by the Kaldor-
Hicks refinement, which holds that an action is efficient if wealth transfers to
achieve Pareto optimality could be made, even when they are not in fact
made. 222 One reason that the Kaldor-Hicks refinement has been thought
necessary is because of the difficulty of adopting large-scale social or
economic policies that make no one worse off and the related costliness of
identifying those who are made worse off and transferring wealth to them.
223
The "do no harm" principle rejects the Kaldor-Hicks refinement, and insists
on transfers to those who might be made worse off by class treatment. The
reason is that, unlike large-scale social or economic policies whose various
permutations can create polycentric distributions of winners and losers,224
class actions are fairly self-contained and organized around the discrete goal
of maximizing the value of a class's legal claims. Therefore, it is relatively
the class to those that would be harmed, is impermissible. The "do no harm" principle requires this
distribution.
220. See POSNER, supra note 28, § 1.2, at 12.
221. See THOMAS J. MICELI, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO LAW 4 (2004) (explaining that an
allocation is Pareto efficient or Pareto optimal if there is no other allocation that is Pareto superior
to it).
222. This state is also sometimes described as "potential Pareto efficiency." Id. at 5-6;
POSNER, supra note 28, § 1.2, at 13.
223. See MICELI, supra note 221, at 5-6 (describing the problems with using Pareto efficiency
to evaluate proposed policy changes and explaining that economists employ Kaldor-Hicks
efficiency to address these problems); A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND
ECONOMICS 8-9 (3d ed. 2003) (illustrating the conflict between efficiency and equity).
224. Cf Fuller, supra note 24, at 394-95 (discussing polycentrism in the adoption of wage and
price legislation whose various permutations create different advantaged and disadvantaged parties).
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easy and inexpensive for class representatives and class counsel to identify
class members who might be harmed by the positions taken by the represen-
tative and counsel in seeking to maximize that value, and then to modulate
their behavior to make those class members at least indifferent to the out-
comes they receive in the class action. I will return to this point shortly.2 25
For now, however, it is enough to say that the "do no harm" principle ensures
that class treatment will be more efficient than individual litigation, and-
because the "no conflict of interest" principle prevents certification of class
actions in which such efficiency might otherwise be attained2 2 6-will also
lead to greater efficiency than the "no conflict of interest" principle.
In sum, the "do no harm" principle acknowledges the inevitability of
conflicts of interest in class actions, and addresses those conflicts through a
simple rule that leaves no one worse off because of them. Because all have
an expected outcome equal to or greater than the outcome that they would
have achieved through individual lawsuits, the principle vindicates the sub-
stance of the individualist model of litigation. At the same time, it captures
the benefits of reduced harms to class members, to the defendant, and to so-
ciety that class actions seek to achieve. Because none are made worse and
some are made better, the "do no harm" principle also ensures that class ac-
tions will enhance social welfare.
B. Four Objections
Admittedly, the "do no harm" measure of adequate representation is not
a perfect solution. In this subpart, I examine four objections. The first
three-administrability, equity, and inefficiency-attack potential weak-
nesses in the principle itself. The final objection-the availability of
alternatives-explores whether other solutions might achieve better results in
dealing with conflicts of interest while still enhancing social welfare.
1. Administrability.-The first critique of the "do no harm" principle is
the potential difficulty of its administration. The critique has two
components. The first is the inability to quantify many of the variables
necessary for an exact calculation. The second, related concern is the seem-
ing need for recalculation of the class representative's and class counsel's
adequacy after every action that they take.
It is indeed true that precise measurements under the "do no harm"
formula are difficult to make, especially early in the litigation. On the other
hand, it is unlikely that such detailed calculations will be necessary. Early in
a class action that is filed as a litigation class action,227 a prima facie showing
225. See infra notes 2305-39 and accompanying text.
226. See supra notes 88-97 and accompanying text.
227. A "litigation class action" is distinguishable from a "settlement class action." As the terms
imply, the former is filed with the stated goal of adjudicating the dispute to a final judgment; the
latter is filed to give effect to a settlement upon which the defendant has agreed with the putative
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of adequate representation can be made by proving that the class action does
not reduce the value of any class member's claims, but does reduce the liti-
gation costs of each class member in relation to individual litigation. 228 The
same ballpark estimate can be used as major developments in the case-the
joinder of new parties, the filing of amended pleadings, the dismissal of
claims, summary judgment, the trial, and so on-unfold.229 Should a settle-
ment occur, the court has the opportunity to calculate adequacy with greater
precision; some necessary values, such as the amount of per capita recovery
and the size of the fees and costs can now be known with a degree of
certainty. Of course, even here, some variables-such as the expected value
and costs associated with individual litigation-cannot be known with
precision, but ballpark data will be available in many cases. 230 And, in the
event of true uncertainty about whether class treatment will harm a class
member's interest, the rule that the class representative must prove adequacy
of representation will defeat class certification.
231
2. Equity.-A second criticism of the "do no harm" position is that it
permits inequalities within the class. This criticism can take two forms. The
first form-that it does not guarantee an equal outcome to every class
member-can be dismissed out of hand. In most situations, different class
members come into the class with claims that are unequal in terms of their
class representative and class counsel. See TIDMARSH & TRANGSRUD, suprai note 21, at 550
(explaining that class actions formerly were brought principally to litigate claims, but now class
actions are increasingly used as a way to achieve settlements).
228. Conversely, inadequacy of representation could be shown with respect to a particular class
member if, in a positive-value suit, either (1) the class action reduces the expected gross recovery of
that class member's claim (for instance, by not asserting a unique, viable, recovery-enhancing legal
theory that a particular class member has) by more than any expected savings arising from the
spread of litigation costs among the class; or (2) the per capita cost of class treatment exceeds any
increases in expected gross recovery from class treatment. In a negative-value case, inadequacy of
representation exists when the expected gross recovery for some class members is less than the per
capita litigation costs that are likely be assessed against that member.
229. If a defendant or class member believes that interim developments between major events
demonstrate inadequacy, nothing prevents that party from raising the issue with the court.
230. Cf Reynolds v. Beneficial Nat'l Bank, 288 F.3d 277, 285 (7th Cir. 2002) (noting the
difficulty of the precise valuation of a class's expected recovery in litigation, but suggesting ways to
achieve at least a "ballpark valuation"). Especially when a class action is certified after the
litigation has matured, see supra note 126, such data should be available. In negative-value cases,
however, it is unlikely that there have been enough prior cases for the litigation to reach maturity,
and therefore there is a dearth of data. See Benjamin J. Siegel, Note, Applying a "Maturity Factor"
Without Compromising the Goals of the Class Action, 85 TEXAS L. REV. 741, 751-52 (2007)
(observing that negative-value suits are unlikely to be litigated enough to yield adequate data for
maturity analyses). Nonetheless, in these cases, the "do no harm" adequacy question is simple, and
the answer does not require data from prior cases: Does any class member have a negative net
recovery (calculated by subtracting the pro rata share of fees and expenses assessed against that
class member from the settlement proceeds that the class member receives)?
231. See Berger v. Compaq Computer Corp., 257 F.3d 475, 481, 481-82 (5th Cir. 2001)
(articulating the standard that "the party seeking certification bears the burden of establishing that
all requirements of rule 23(a) have been satisfied").
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number and strength, and in terms of the injuries that they have suffered.
Class actions are not economic leveling devices intended to enforce a strict
equality of outcome on their members.
A second form of this criticism is more troubling-that the "do no
harm" principle can foster greater inequalities than individual litigation
would. The criticism has particular salience in the large-scale, small-stakes
context. To take a hypothetical example, assume a negative-value suit in
which 10 million customers have lost $2 apiece as a result of an illegal over-
charge by a credit card company. The "do no harm" principle would be
satisfied if the case settled for $10,000,003, with the class representative re-
ceiving $3, the class counsel receiving $10 million, and the remaining class
members receiving nothing. Because the remaining class members are no
worse off than they would have been with individual control (their claims
were, as a practical matter, worthless), and because the class representative
and class counsel are better off, the representation in this case is, under the
"do no harm" principle, adequate.
My initial reaction to this evident difficulty was to switch the "do no
harm" principle to the weak Pareto-optimal condition of "do some good": in
other words, to require the class representative and class counsel to distribute
the overall gains from class treatment in such a way that every class member
is better off as a result of class treatment. But that change does little to solve
the problem; for the "do some good" condition is satisfied if class counsel
agrees to take $9,990,000.01 in fees and costs, gives $3 to the class
representative, and gives one cent to the remaining 9,999,999 class members.
Indeed, on these facts, the "do some good" solution is less efficient than the
"do no harm" principle because of the costs associated with distributing the
penny to each class member.
The "do no harm" principle does not bar the hypothetical $10,000,003
settlement. "Do no harm" adequacy does not require equality of treatment
among class members, and it can create greater inequities between the class
representative and class members than those that predated the lawsuit (when
the class representative and class members had equal $2 claims that, as a
practical matter, were equally worthless).232 The principle is intended to
check self-interest and collusion that make class members worse off. It is a
minimal principle, rather than a maximal version of adequacy that requires
the gains from class treatment to be distributed among claimants in propor-
tion to the strength and extent of their claims-in effect, it is an "equal gains
for equal claims" principle.
232. This example is an application of one common criticism of Pareto improvements and
optimality-that they can foster greater social inequalities even as they improve efficiency. See
POSNER, supra note 28, § 1.2, at 13-14 (discussing how inequalities in the distribution of wealth
affect the consumption and production decisions of parties to an economic transaction); AMARTYA
KUMAR SEN, COLLECTIVE CHOICE AND SOCIAL WELFARE 22 (1970) ("An economy can be optimal
in this sense even when some people are rolling in luxury and others are near starvation as long as
the starvers cannot be made better off without cutting into the pleasures of the rich.").
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Despite its surface appeal, one problem with an "equal gains for equal
claims" principle is the difficulty of applying it in many class actions. When
class members present an array of temporally and geographically dispersed
claims and injuries, an "equal gains for equal claims" principle requires the
collection of a great deal of information, as well as difficult judgments about
which claims, claimants, and distributions are in fact "equal. 23 3  Such a
principle would therefore eat deeply into-and perhaps surpass-the gains in
reduced litigation costs and avoidance of harms that are the raison d'Otre of
Rule 23. The implementation of the principle will also make the tasks of
serving as class representative and class counsel more onerous and less ap-
pealing and will make collateral attacks on the adequacy of representation,
which undermine the finality of class litigation, more likely.234 In short, an
"equal gains for equal claims" principle will likely lead to fewer class actions
than a "do no harm" principle, thereby thwarting the benefits that class ac-
tions provide.
That fact alone is not a reason to reject such a principle, but there is
another reason as well. Real-world dynamics temper the inequities inherent
in the "do no harm" principle and push the parties toward the "equal gains
for equal claims" principle without incurring the added costs of adopting the
latter principle across the board. To explain, begin by assuming that the class
action reaches trial, and the factfinder (jury or judge) finds the defendant
liable. In considering the appropriate remedy, the self-interested class
representative will want to pitch the remedy (whether injunctive or
monetary) as favorably to herself as possible. The self-interested class
counsel is likely to push back against the preference, at least in cases seeking
monetary relief; for the size of the attorneys fee grows as counsel enhances
the value of the claims of the entire class. Moreover, to use to the credit-card
hypothetical again, it is inconceivable that, after finding the defendant liable,
233. The "do no harm" principle also requires the collection of some of this same information.
See infra note 235 and accompanying text. But it does not require a judge to classify class members
into equal groups for the purposes of determining adequacy.
234. The scope of a class member's right to attack a judgment collaterally has divided the
courts. Compare Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 179 F.3d 641, 648 (9th Cir. 1999) (restricting the right of
collateral attack), with Stephenson v. Dow Chem. Co., 273 F.3d 249, 257 (2d Cir. 2001), aff'd in
part by an equally divided Court and vacated in part, 539 U.S. 111 (2003) (permitting collateral
attack when class members were inadequately represented in the class action), and Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc. v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 396 F.3d 96, 110 (2d Cir. 2005) (distinguishing Stephenson and restricting
the right of collateral attack). The literature is equally divided. See, e.g., Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. et
al., An Historical Analysis of the Binding Effect of Class Suits, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1849, 1946-47
(1998) (tracing the historical progress of class suits, with particular focus on the consistent failure to
adequately resolve the issue of class suits' preclusive effect on absentees); Henry Paul Monaghan,
Antisuit Injunctions and Preclusion Against Absent Nonresident Class Members, 98 COLUM. L.
REv. 1148, 1202 (1998) ("[A]bsent class members should be allowed to make their collateral due
process challenges in a forum of their own choosing."). For attempts to find a middle ground, see
Marcel Kahan & Linda Silberman, The Inadequate Search for "Adequacy" in Class Actions: A
Critique of Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 73 N.Y.U. L. REv. 765, 789 (1998); and William B. Rubenstein,
Finality in Class Litigation: Lessons from Habeas, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 790, 867 (2007).
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a jury or judge will order a $3 recovery for the class representative and a
one-cent recovery for the remainder of the class. It is important to recall that,
in order to satisfy a "do no harm" principle, the class representative and class
counsel must have presented to the trial judge evidence of the nature,
strength, and extent of the claims of class members. Armed with the knowl-
edge that the claims of every class member are equal in strength and size, the
trial judge, and the judges on appeal, will not permit such an inequitable dis-
tribution to survive post-trial review of the judgment.2 35
Therefore, as a realistic matter, the only circumstance in which the
inequity created by a "do no harm" principle might be realized is the
settlement context. Even with settlement, however, real-world checks pre-
vent gross inequalities in treatment. A class settlement requires judicial
approval, and judicial approval can be given only if the court finds the set-
tlement to be "fair, reasonable, and adequate." 236  As the last paragraph
noted, the judge will possess information regarding the nature of each class
member's claim. Given the judge's knowledge, a settlement containing
gross disparities in the distribution of settlement proceeds, in which the class
representative and class counsel capture virtually all of the remedy that ex-
ceeds the remedy that class members would receive in individual litigation, is
unlikely to secure judicial approval.237 Moreover, in positive-value monetary
suits, a gross distributional disparity is likely to cause some class members to
opt out of the settlement if they have the opportunity to do so.238 For these
reasons alone, a self-interested class counsel, who is ultimately indifferent to
the distribution of the remedy, would be unlikely to acquiesce to seriously
inequitable provisions that threaten either the certification of the class (and
hence the ability to obtain a fee) or the size of the fee. A final dynamic that
minimizes the possibility of inequitable treatment under the "do no harm"
approach is the likelihood that a settlement would establish a claims-
235. Admittedly, self-interested class representatives knowing this fact have an incentive to
skew the evidence presented in the initial "do no harm" showing in order to make their cases appear
stronger, and therefore deserving of a greater eventual remedy. But there are clear limits on the
extent of the skewing that can occur; if class representatives make their claims appear too disparate
from that of the remainder of the class, they will fail the commonality and typicality requirements of
Rules 23(a)(2) and (a)(3). See Gen. Tel. Co. of the Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 156-60 (1982)
(reversing the class-certification order because the district court committed error by presuming that
the class representative's claim was typical of other racial-discrimination claims against the
defendant corporation).
236. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2).
237. But, unfortunately, it is not impossible, as the Kamilewicz story proves. See supra notes
162-64 and accompanying text.
238. In a (b)(3) settlement class action, class members have a right to opt out. FED. R. Civ. P.
23(c)(2)(B)(v). In a litigation class action that was previously certified, a court has the power to
provide a second opt-out right at the time of the settlement. FED. R. CIv. P. 23(e)(4); see also
AGGREGATE LITIGATION, supra note 6, § 3.11 (recommending that a second opt-out right ordinarily
be given). But see David Rosenberg, Mandatory-Litigation Class Action: The Only Option for
Mass Tort Cases, 115 HARV. L. REv. 831, 840--66 (2002) (arguing that plaintiffs should not be
permitted to opt out of class actions).
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resolution facility, perhaps in combination with a back-end opt-out provision
that allows parties dissatisfied with an award to enter a trial-like dispute-
resolution process. 239 These quasi-administrative mechanisms tend to treat
groups of like claimants very much alike, rather than to create disparate
remedies for similarly situated class members.
3. Efficiency.-The "do no harm" principle can also be criticized for its
inefficiency. There are two branches in the criticism. The first is that the
"do no harm" calculation-especially the calculation determining each class
member's expected outcome from retaining individual control (the baseline
against which adequate representation is measured)-is either too costly or
too prone to error. The second is that alternate formulations of adequate rep-
resentation realize greater efficiency than the "do no harm" principle.
As to the first criticism, determining each class member's expected
outcome from individual litigation presents no difficulty in negative-value
suits, in which the practical value of recovery is, by definition, zero. When
the claims of class members have positive value-and when the value of
those claims can depend on such matters as the type and strength of the
claims and defenses, the type and extent of injury, temporal or geographical
dispersion, and the defendant's future solvency-the criticism has more
salience. Once again, however, practical considerations modulate this
concern. First, the costs of making the "do no harm" calculation and of err-
ing in the calculation are less troublesome in injunctive suits, which typically
involve a limited array of potential remedies, than they are in actions seeking
monetary recovery. Second, other constraints in Rule 23, such as Amchem's
narrow interpretation of Rule 23(b)(3), 240 make sprawling class actions with
vastly different claims, defenses, and injuries unsuitable for class treatment
on grounds other than adequacy-thus making the difficult calculation of
individual-litigation variants in these cases unnecessary. Next, for most
purposes, a judge can ballpark the "do no harm" calculation. 241 Fourth, the
risk of failing to prove adequate representation falls on the class representa-
tive and class counsel, 242 who are typically in the best position to provide
information from which a reasonably accurate and inexpensive calculation
239. Two variants of this approach are found in the settlements established (and invalidated on
other grounds) in Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997), and Ortiz v. Fibreboard
Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999). For descriptions of these plans, see TIDMARSH, supra note 97, at 51-
54, 64-66. A comparable plan was negotiated in the Silicon Gel Breast Implant litigation. See In re
Silicone Gel Breast Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., No. CV 92-P-10000-S, 1994 WL 578353 (N.D. Ala.
Sept. 1, 1994); TIDMARSH, supra note 97, at 79-82. On claims-resolution facilities generally, see
Mark A. Peterson, Giving Away Money: Comparative Comments on Claims Resolution Facilities,
53 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1990, at 113, 114-21.
240. See Amchem, 521 U.S. at 624, 622-25 (emphasizing that even if Rule 23(b)(3)'s
commonality requirement could be met by a showing that each of the class members had been
exposed to defendant's asbestos products, the "predominance criterion is far more demanding").
241. See supra notes 227-31 and accompanying text.
242. See supra note 231 and accompanying text.
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can be made; thus, the incentives to provide sufficient information are
aligned properly. Finally, with regard to litigation that has matured before
class certification is sought,243 data from which to make the calculations are
available.
Nonetheless, to the extent that the "do no harm" calculation is
excessively costly, it dooms class treatment. A central criterion for any class
action that operates independently of the "do no harm" principle is that the
class action achieve greater efficiency than individual litigation.244 But it is
important to note that the criticism of costliness is not peculiar to the "do no
harm" principle. Any principle to determine adequacy of representation en-
tails costs of administration and costs of erroneous determinations. The
questions, therefore, are whether the "do no harm" approach creates
marginally greater costs than other adequacy formulations do, and whether
those marginal additional costs (if any) outweigh the benefits of the "do no
harm" approach in relation to the benefits of those other approaches. As I
have described, "do some good" or "equal gains for equal claims" ap-
proaches can be more costly in terms of implementation and information-
gathering; 245 and the traditional "no conflicts of interest" approach, if rigor-
ously enforced, leads to the certification (and resulting elimination of harm)
246
of very few class actions.
The second criticism, which is more substantial, contains two related
parts. First, it might be argued, minimally, that we should adopt another
principle that is a Pareto improvement over the "do no harm" principle.
Second, it might be argued, maximally, that we should adopt as the principle
of adequate representation the requirement that the class representative and
class counsel maximize the value of the class's claim.
On the first, minimalist criticism, it is possible to posit other adequacy-
of-representation principles that might be Pareto improvements over the "do
no harm" principle. One possible principle is this: the class representative
and class counsel must achieve from the class action the best net result for
each class member. For example, class representatives and class counsel are
inadequate if they agree to a settlement that provides less recovery to some
class members than the members' expected recovery after a class-action
trial.247 Such a principle is not, however, a Pareto improvement over the "do
no harm" principle in all circumstances; if both the class settlement and the
net expected class recovery at trial are less than a class member's net
243. See supra note 126.
244. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
245. See supra text preceding note 232; supra note 233 and accompanying text.
246. See supra Part II.
247. See Reynolds v. Beneficial Nat'l Bank, 288 F.3d 277, 284-85 (7th Cir. 2002) (stating that
judges should "quantify the net expected value of continued litigation to the class, since a settlement
for less than that value would not be adequate").
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expected recovery from individual litigation, this principle is not more
efficient.
A different principle that appears to be a Pareto improvement is this: the
class representative and class counsel are adequate representatives of a class
member if and only if they act in such a way that they obtain for that class
member a net expected recovery that is at least as good as the recovery that
the class member could obtain from the best available method other than the
present class action for resolving the case. In effect, this too is a "do no
harm" principle; but the baseline against which harm is measured is not indi-
vidual litigation, but rather all other possible methods by which the case
might be resolved-including multidistrict litigation, consolidation, and even
competing class actions filed elsewhere. 48
First, although this principle sounds like a Pareto improvement over the
"do no harm" principle, in some circumstances it is not; the principle can
lead to a finding of inadequacy (and hence no class treatment) even though
class treatment would be the most efficient result.249 Second, the dynamics
of class-action litigation, which I have previously described, are sufficient in
many cases to push a judgment or settlement in a direction that is Pareto su-
perior to the position the class members would occupy under the "do no
harm" principle. 250 Third, the reason that I chose individual litigation as the
baseline against which to measure Pareto improvements-as opposed to an-
other baseline such as the best alternative other than the present class
248. I am grateful to Sarah Lawsky for the precision with which she stated this principle.
249. Consider the hypothetical situation in which the defendant holds a $1 million fund, against
which 100 claimants have identical $20,000 claims. Assume as well that eighty of the claimants
have present claims (the other twenty claims having not yet matured), that the claims involve a
federal question, and all eighty claimants file in federal court. Finally, assume that there are three
possible ways to adjudicate the dispute: (1) Individual actions, in which each plaintiff has a 40%
probability of success and each case involves $7,000 in fees and costs (incurred by claimants only if
the case is successful); (2) a multidistrict (MDL) proceeding, in which the eighty present claimants
are consolidated for pretrial purposes, the probability of success on each claim rises to 75%, and the
per-plaintiff expected fees and costs (incurred only if the case is successful) are $4,200; and (3) a
mandatory class action of all 100 claimants, in which the probability of success is 75% and the per-
plaintiff expected costs and fees (incurred only if the case is successful) are $3,000. In this case, the
net expected recovery in individual litigation is $5,200 ($20,000 gross recovery less $7,000 in
expenses, discounted by the 0.4 probability). The net expected recovery per claimant in the mass-
joinder action is $6,225 ($12,500 gross recovery less $4,200 in expenses, discounted by the 0.75
probability). The net expected recovery per claimant in the class action is $5,250 ($10,000 gross
recovery less $3,000 in expenses, discounted by the 0.75 probability). On these facts, the class
action "does harm" in relation to the mass-joinder option; the class representative and class counsel
therefore cannot adequately represent the class under the "do no harm compared to other methods"
principle. The problem, however, is that the MDL approach is inefficient in relation to the class-
action approach. First, it creates a risk of harm either to the absent twenty claimants (if the MDL
approach renders the defendant insolvent) or to the defendant (if the defendant is called upon to
make good on the twenty remaining $20,000 claims). Second, the cost of obtaining judgment in the
MDL situation is $336,000 ($4,200 per plaintiff multiplied by eighty plaintiffs), a less efficient
result than the $300,000 ($3,000 per class member multiplied by 100 class members) cost under the
class-action approach.
250. See supra notes 235-39 and accompanying text.
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action-is the orientation of our joinder system toward individual control as
the default litigation position.251 The same orientation exists in the Mathews
v. Eldridge formulation of due process: The constitutionality of any departure
from adversarial process is measured against the outcome achieved in indi-
vidual litigation, not against other second-best alternatives.252 It is perhaps a
trite, but nonetheless accurate, observation that "adequate" representation is
not perfect representation, and we have always measured adequacy in rela-
tion to the opportunities that a litigant might enjoy in a separate lawsuit.
Fourth, the majority of class actions are Rule 23(b)(3) actions, and
Rule 23(b)(3) requires as a condition of certification that class treatment be
"superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating
the controversy., 253 Nothing in this language suggests that the (b)(3) class
action must make the position of each class member better in relation to
second-best alternatives. 54  Conversely, one factor that is relevant in
determining superiority is Rule 23(b)(3)(A), which provides that a court can
consider class members' "interests in individually controlling the
prosecution... of separate actions. 2 55  Thus, the idea that a class action
must not worsen the interests of class members in relation to individual liti-
gation is built into the superiority analysis in a way that the idea of not
worsening the position of class members in relation to second-best
alternatives is not.
The second, maximalist criticism of the "do no harm" principle is to
attack its inefficiency in relation to another possible adequacy principle: a
principle that the constitutional duty of class representatives and class coun-
sel is to maximize the value of the claim of the class and to ignore the harm
to the positions of individual class members completely. This principle re-
quires representatives and counsel to pursue the Pareto-optimal outcome (as
reconfigured by the Kaldor-Hicks refinement). Admittedly, the "do no
harm" principle does not require the class representative or class counsel to
engage in actions that maximize the value of the claims of the class as a
whole. From a utilitarian perspective, this fact is problematic. The logical
conclusion of utilitarianism is to maximize the good. In theory, one action
achieves that maximum and can therefore be regarded as ethically superior to
any other action. The "do no harm" principle stops short of requiring that
251. See supra subpart I(A).
252. See supra note 194 and accompanying text.
253. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
254. In effect, the superiority analysis of Rule 23(b)(3) operates like a principle of Pareto
superiority, but with the Kaldor-Hicks refinement: It requires that a class action be a Pareto
improvement over alternative methods of recovery, but it does not require that the benefits of that
improvement be spread across all members of the class so that no class member is less worse off
than the member would be under the second-best alternative. If it were otherwise, the superiority
requirement would defeat some class actions that were more efficient than the second-best
alternative.
255. FED. R. CIv. P. 23(b)(3)(A).
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action and therefore cannot be regarded as the ethically superior rule. Nor
does the principle lead to the greatest economic efficiency.
But this criticism can be leveled against most of the law, including the
law of joinder and the law of class actions. Individual control of litigation
under Rule 20 does not necessarily lead to maximum social utility in every
case. More to the point, class actions under Rule 23(b)(1) and (b)(2), which
contain no superiority requirement, will not achieve the maximum social
utility in every case; a measure of adequacy requiring wealth maximization
would prevent such class actions from being certified. 6 Indeed, if pursuing
the most efficient outcome were the constitutional baseline for measuring
adequacy, then all class representation, save for the single wealth-
maximizing strategy, must be deemed inadequate. Mathews v. Eldridge's
formulation of due process is not so stringent; it does not require wealth-
maximizing procedure, but rather holds that any procedure that is a Pareto
improvement over adversarial process is constitutional. Moreover, by forc-
ing the class representative and class counsel to adopt a wealth-maximizing
strategy, which might not allow them to capture for themselves some gains
associated with class treatment, one incentive for representatives and counsel
to seek certification is reduced, possibly reducing the effective level of
deterrence that class actions can achieve.
As I have described, the efficiency requirements of Rules 23(a)(1)-
(3),257 the superiority requirement of Rule 23(b)(3), 258 and the dynamics of
class-action litigation2 59 already do the heavy lifting of maximizing utility.
The "do no harm" principle also works to promote efficiency to a degree: It
prevents backsliding toward less efficient solutions due to the actions of self-
interested class representatives and class counsel who seek to improve their
own positions by causing greater harm to others. The point of the principle is
not to maximize wealth directly, but to check selfish behavior by those who
are not committed to maximizing the class's wealth or otherwise caring for
their interests. The "do no harm" principle does not prevent class represen-
tatives and class counsel who wish to do so from maximizing class wealth-
as long as the consequence of doing so is not visited on a few whose posi-
tions are made worse. The principle respects the substance, if not the form,
of individual control, on which American society sets a high value. Finally,
by not inflexibly requiring the pursuit of the single path of wealth
maximization, the "do no harm" principle allows class representatives and
class counsel some latitude of action without raising the fear that every
256. The harms that Rules 23(b)(1) and (b)(2) protect against are not necessarily harms in an
economic sense. For instance, in the limited-fund context of Rule 23(b)(1)(B), it is a matter of
indifference from the viewpoint of deterrence and efficiency whether the fund is given only to the
early claimants or instead is spread equitably among all claimants. A no-class-action alternative
leads to the former result, and the 23(b)(l)(B) alternative leads to the latter.
257. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
258. See supra notes 147-49 and accompanying text.
259. See supra notes 235-39 and accompanying text.
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action they take will result in a challenge to their constitutional adequacy.
Adequate representation does not require optimal representation.
4. Alternative Solutions.-A final criticism of the "do no harm"
principle is the possible availability of other mechanisms or principles that
might achieve greater utility at less cost. I have already examined a few al-
ternatives for defining adequate representation, such as a "do some good"
principle and an "equal gains for equal claims" principle, and found them
lacking.26 °
In its Principles on the Law ofAggregate Litigation, the American Law
Institute (ALl) has created a menu of solutions for achieving adequate
representation. Among its suggestions are "control of litigation decisions"
by "named parties with sizeable stakes," "fiduciary duties," appointment of
"competent counsel," "financial incentives," and subclassing and other
"case-management techniques. 261 Using the vocabulary of the ALI, the "do
no harm" principle can be regarded as a fiduciary duty for the class repre-
sentative and an ethical obligation of competent counsel. But the generality
of the ALI's suggestions renders them less than helpful in creating specific
potential alternatives to the "do no harm" principle. 62 Hence, I consider sev-
eral specific alternatives to the "do no harm" principle that meet the general
guidelines of the ALI. None are superior to "do no harm" adequacy.
a. Reconceptualizing the Nature of the Class Action.-An option
for dealing with the inevitability of conflicting individual interests that
sometimes appears in the popular literature is to reconceive the nature of the
class, so that it is no longer seen as an amalgam of self-interested individuals,
but rather as an organic entity with its own interests distinct from those of the
members of the class.263 The class representative and class counsel would
then be seen as having fiduciary duties to represent this gestalt class interest,
rather than the interest of individuals within the class.
The problem with this approach is that it still does not tell a class
representative or class counsel how to behave, or tell the court how to
measure adequacy. The apparent (albeit not certain) corollary of a "class as
client" theory is an ethical requirement that the class representative and class
counsel work to maximize the utility of the class as a whole. As we have
260. See supra notes 232-34 and accompanying text.
261. AGGREGATE LITIGATION, supra note 6, § 1.05(c). These suggestions are intended to
apply both to class actions and to nonclass-action litigation. As the draft recognizes, however, the
ability to impose an adequacy-of-representation requirement by law is often possible only in class
actions and similar representational litigation. Id. cmt. (c).
262. I have already treated one of the few specific suggestions of the ALI-subclassing-and
found it wanting as a sufficient control over the reality of self-interested behavior by the class
representative and class counsel. See supra notes 110-14 and accompanying text.
263. For one exploration of this issue, see generally David L. Shapiro, Class Actions: The Class
as Party and Client, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 913 (1998).
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seen, there are numerous difficulties with adopting a constitutional
requirement that only one set of actions can fulfill. 264 The model does not
solve the problem of the self-interested class representative or class counsel:
There is no reason to believe that self-interested class representatives and
class counsel will protect the interests of this organic entity any more than
they will protect the interests of absent class members. Unless class repre-
sentatives and class counsel are invariably altruistic actors or wealth
maximizers-and if they are, we would not be in the present conundrum-
some class representatives and class counsel will still look out for their self-
interests when those interests diverge from those of the class.
b. Designating an Overseer of the Class's Interests.-In a prior
draft of Principles on the Law of Aggregate Litigation, the ALI suggested as
a means of ensuring adequacy the appointment of someone to oversee the
class representative and class counsel and thus to ensure that they are repre-
senting the interests of absent class members. 265 An evident difficulty with
this approach is finding the appropriate guardian of the class members'
interests. For obvious reasons, this overseer cannot be class counsel: It is
precisely the self-interest of class counsel that often inspires the need for a
doctrine of adequate representation.
In looking elsewhere for an overseer to save the class from a self-
interested class representative and class counsel, an obvious candidate is the
judge, who could be charged with being especially solicitous of the interests
of the absent class. Sometimes the judge's role has been conceived in such
terms, but judges understandably resist this approach. In the first instance,
they lack the information or institutional capacity to police self-interested
behavior by the class representative or class counsel. In the second instance,
this model of judicial behavior fundamentally changes the nature of the judi-
cial function in an adversarial system. A judge cannot be both a fiduciary for
class members and an impartial adjudicator of their claims.
Realizing this, a judge might look elsewhere-to guardians ad litem, for
instance-for someone to represent the interests of absent class members.
The literature on the performance of guardians ad litem is not, however, en-
couraging in terms of their ability to protect those whom they represent.266
Moreover, we need to assume that guardians ad litem are altruistically inter-
ested in advancing the aims of the class members they represent, not self-
interested in their own fees or reputation. Finally, a guardian turns the idea
264. See supra note 256 and accompanying text.
265. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 1.06(b)(5) (Discussion Draft
2006) (including "judges, participants, other litigation managers, and third parties" as possible
overseers).
266. See Thomas A. Smith, A Capital Markets Approach to Mass Tort Bankruptcy, 104 YALE
L.J. 367, 389-91 (1994) (recounting the story of the Mannville reorganization, where the
representative of future claimants was mostly unmonitored and brokered a deal that effectively left
the future claimants with nothing).
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of Rule 23(a) on its head: One of the requirements of Rule 23(a) designed to
ensure adequacy of representation is that the class representative must be a
member of the class, 267 and the guardian is not.
In any event, reconceiving the roles of class counsel, judge, or guardian
ad litem assumes that the designated overseer can decipher the interests of
the class and employ a metric to determine when those interests are ade-
quately represented. Without a metric, oversight seems futile, or at least will
result in oversight among class actions as widely disparate as the measure of
a chancellor's foot. With a metric-such as the "do no harm" principle-
there is no need for complex institutional arrangements; the judge (aided,
perhaps by a traditional adjunct such as a magistrate judge or master) can
determine adequacy directly.
c. Continual Opt-Out Rights.-A third solution is to allow class
members a continual right to opt out of a class action. Opt-out rights are
rarely invoked,268 so there is still the realistic concern for self-interested be-
havior in such a setting. Opt-out rights are expensive, at least if we are
serious about providing notice to class members at every stage at which class
members might wish to opt out. Permitting opt-outs also reduces the preclu-
sive effect of a class action, thus spawning satellite litigation. A general opt-
out right would significantly restructure the present Rule 23, which allows
(in almost all cases) an opt-out right only in (b)(3) class actions. 269 Finally,
once class members have opted out, the very harms that class actions are in-
tended to prevent (to the class representative, the defendant, the class
members, or society) can occur.
d. Opt-In Requirements.-A fourth solution is to require class
members to opt in: Class actions consist only of those members who
affirmatively choose to opt into the class. 270 At a theoretical level, this solu-
tion avoids all of the concerns for self-interested behavior of class actions; an
opt-in model is an exercise of a litigant's autonomy, akin to joinder under
Rule 20, and thus any failings of the class representative and class counsel to
267. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a) ("One or more members of a class may sue... on behalf of
all .... ").
268. See WILLGING ET AL., supra note 51, at 52, 52-53 ("[Tjhe median percentage of members
who opted out was either 0.1% or 0.2% of the total membership of the class and 75% of the opt-out
cases had 1.2% or fewer class members opt out.").
269. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
270. This is a return to the "spurious" class action idea that predated the present Rule 23(b)(3),
which instead set the default as an opt-out rule. Owen Fiss and John Bronsteen are modern
proponents of an opt-in solution. See John Bronsteen, Class Action Settlements: An Opt-In
Proposal, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 903, 906 (proposing that class-action settlements, which are
currently binding on any class member who does not expressly opt-out, should instead be binding
only on those who explicitly opt into the settlement); Bronsteen & Fiss, supra note 55, at 1453
(suggesting a change in class-action rules that would require class members to consent to the
settlement before it would become binding on them).
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protect class members' interests can be treated as a waiver by the class
member of individual rights. At a practical level, however, an opt-in strategy
gets even less preclusive effect than an opt-out strategy, and increases the
likelihood and scope of the potential harm from multiple lawsuits. It can re-
quire an expensive notice campaign. Moreover, the concern for self-
interested behavior by class representatives and class counsel does not disap-
pear in an opt-in class action; the doctrine of waiver simply ignores the
problem.27'
IV. Conclusion
Colleagues who have heard my proposal have sometimes asked whether
the "do no harm" measure of adequate representation will lead to more or
fewer class actions. To some, the principle seems likely to lead to certifica-
tion of fewer class actions, with the undesirable result that more widespread
wrongdoing by large entities will go undeterred and more victims will remain
uncompensated. To others, the principle seems likely to lead to more class
certifications, both because it replaces an unworkable identity-of-interests
approach with something more flexible, and because it might have the spill-
over effect of making courts willing to rein in some of their recent hostility to
(b)(3) class actions.
It seems out of place in an Article that has stressed a consequentialist
approach to the adequacy problem to answer this question by saying, "I don't
know, and I don't care. The principle is right regardless of its
consequences." So my first inclination-to say that adoption of the "do no
harm" principle ensures that those class actions that are certified will have
the beneficial consequence of increasing social welfare-dodges the
question. My second inclination is to believe that the principle is unlikely to
have a significant effect on the number of class actions filed. Even though
class actions inherently place people with conflicting interests into a single
class,272 class actions are frequently certified. That fact suggests that courts
are already finding (perhaps subconscious) ways to reconcile the adequacy
requirement with the presence of conflicts of interest. Indeed, the "do no
harm" principle might well be the rule of thumb already operating in some
courts. Elsewhere, the operative rule of thumb is probably more restrictive
than the "do no harm" rule in some courts and less restrictive in others. In
global terms, therefore, the adoption of a "do no harm" principle is probably
a wash.
One of the principal advantages of replacing these rules of thumb with
the "do no harm" principle is the transparency of an above-the-table rule that
can replace a bevy of uncertain and unknown rules by which individual
judges likely measure adequacy of representation today. The "do no harm"
271. See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
272. See supra Part I1.
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principle is the type of simple, fair rule that makes all of Rule 23 into a pull
harness to achieve the efficient handling of mass litigation and the simulta-
neous reduction of harm to class members, to defendants, and to society. If
we employ it, we will come closer to having the right number of class
actions, whether that number is more or less than the number of class actions
today.
"k "A"
